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IN RE-PRESENTATION
RYUTA ARISAKA
RYUTAARISAKA@GMAIL.COM
Abstract. Our understanding about things is conceptual. By stating that we reason about
objects, it is in fact not the objects but concepts referring to them that we manipulate. Now, so
long just as we acknowledge infinitely extending notions such as space, time, size, colour, etc,
- in short, any reasonable quality - into which an object is subjected, it becomes infeasible to
affirm atomicity in the concept referring to the object. However, formal/symbolic logics typically
presume atomic entities upon which other expressions are built. Can we reflect our intuition about
the concept onto formal/symbolic logics at all? I assure that we can, but the usual perspective
about the atomicity needs inspected. In this work, I present gradual logic which materialises the
observation that we cannot tell apart whether a so-regarded atomic entity is atomic or is just atomic
enough not to be considered non-atomic. The motivation is to capture certain phenomena that
naturally occur around concepts with attributes, including presupposition and contraries. I present
logical particulars of the logic, which is then mapped onto formal semantics. Two linguistically
interesting semantics will be considered. Decidability is shown.
§1. Introduction. I present a logic that expresses gradual shifts in domain
of discourse. The motivation is to capture certain peculiar phenomena about
concepts/objects and other concepts/objects1 as their attributes. The first such
phenomenon is that extension of a concept alters when it becomes an attribute to
other concepts. Also a concept that is specified another concept as its attribute
1 These two terms will not be strongly distinguished in this work. An object may exist by itself,
but to reason about relation between objects or just to speak about them, it is, as we presume,
concepts referring to the objects that we reason/speak about.
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becomes an intension [5, 22, 6] of the concept which itself is an extensional con-
cept. Consider for instance ‘brooch’ed ‘hat’ and ‘brooch’. The ‘brooch’ in the
former is an attribute to ‘hat’. By definition, if anything is an attribute to some-
thing at all, it must be found among all that can be an attribute to it. Whereas the
extension of ‘brooch’ in the latter is only delimited by our understanding about
‘brooch’, that in the former as an attribute of ‘hat’ is delimited also by our un-
derstanding about the concept ‘hat’ (needless to say, only if the understanding
of ours should permit ‘brooch’ as an attribute at all). But this is not all. The
attribute in turn specialises the ‘hat’ to which it is an attribute: the ‘brooch’ed
‘hat’ forms an intension of the ‘hat’, and itself becomes an extensional concept
“brooch’ed ‘hat”.
The shift in extension is not typically observed in formal logics, be they tem-
poral, epistemic, modal etc. Some exceptions that challenge the norm are a kind
of spatio-temporal logics [9, 23] and some kinds of context logics (Cf. [21, 14])
in the line of [4, 24]. In [9] for instance, Gabelaia et al. consider the definition
of EU at a point of time and at another point of time. If some countries are
merged into the current EU, then the term EU will remain EU at the future time
reference as it is now, but the spaces that the two EU occupy are not the same.
Similar phenomena are occurring in the relation between concepts/objects and
their attributes. However, unlike the case of the spatio-temporal logics, there is
no external and global space for them: there are only those spaces generated by
the (extension of) concepts themselves. The stated (re-)action of intension/ex-
tension within an attributed concept/object is another intriguing feature that has
not been formalised before.
Another point about the concept is that a concept in itself, which is to say,
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an atomic concept which does not itself possess any other concepts as its at-
tributes, is almost certainly imperceptible,2 and hence almost certainly cannot
be reasoned about. Typically, however, formal/symbolic logics assume smallest
entities upon which other expressions are formed. In this work I challenge the
assumption, and materialise the observation that we cannot tell apart - that is,
we cannot know - whether a so-regarded atomic entity is atomic or is just atomic
enough not to be considered non-atomic. I present a logic in which every entity
is non-atomic, reflecting our intuition about the concept.3
Strikingly we can represent both extensional shifts and non-atomicity using
the familiar classical logic only (but the results extend to other Boolean logics);
with many domains of discourse.4 The idea is as follows. We shall define a bi-
nary connective ⋗ over classical logic instances. As an example, Hat ⋗ Brooch
reads as; Hat is, and under the presupposition that Hat is, Brooch is as its at-
tribute. In this simple expression there are two domains of discourse: one in
which Hat in Hat ⋗ Brooch is being discussed; and one in which Brooch in
Hat ⋗ Brooch is being discussed. The second domain of discourse as a whole
is delimited by the (extension of) Hat that gives rise to it. Hat ⋗ Brooch is an
intension of Hat, and itself forms an extensional concept. The non-atomicity
2Let us arbitrarily suppose the concept hat, and let us conduct an experiment as to if we could
perceive the hat in itself as something differing from nothingness for which any scenario where
it comes with an attribute is inconceivable. To begin with, if the word hat evoked in our mind
any specific hat with specific colour and shape, we first remove the colour out of it. If the process
should make it transparent, we then remove the transparentness away from it. And if there should
be still some things that are by some means perceivable as having originated from it, then because
they are an attribute of the hat, we again remove any one of them. If the humanly no longer
detectable something is not nothingness is not itself contradictory, then there must be still some
quality originating in the hat that makes the something differ from nothingness. Now the question
is whether the something can be perceived at all to be different from nothingness. Intuition speaks
otherwise.
3The utility of logical non-atomicity is noted in a recent work [17] in programming community.
The idea of logical non-atomicity in formal/symbolic logic itself, however, appears previously in
the immediately preceding work to the current paper, namely, in [2]; as well as, and more bluntly,
in its variation as a technical report.
4The use of multiple domains of discourse is also notable in contextual logics. Connections to
those will be mentioned at the end of this work.
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of concepts is captured without breaking the properties of classical logic. The
ideas are that every concept has attributes, but that the attributes are not dis-
cussed in the same domain of discourse as the concept is discussed in. From
within the domain of discourse discussing Hat in Hat ⋗ Brooch, it cannot be
perceived whether it has or has not attributes, i.e. whether it is atomic or is just
atomic enough not to be considered non-atomic.
We can also explain some reasonably common every-day linguistic phenom-
enon with this connective. Let us turn to an example.
Episode. There is a tiny hat shop in our town, having the following in stock:
1. 3 types of hats: orange hats, green hats ornamented with some brooch, and
blue hats decorated with some white hat-shaped accessory. Only the green
and the blue hats are displayed in the shop.
2. 2 types of shirts: yellow and blue shirts. Only the blue shirts are displayed in
the shop.
A young man has come to the hat shop. After a while he asks the shop owner, a
lady of many a year of experience in hat-making; “Have you got a yellow hat?”
Knowing that it is not in her shop, she answers; “No, I do not have it in stock,”
negating the possibility that there is one in stock at her shop at the present point
of time. Period.
“What is she actually denying about?” is our question, however. It is plausible
that, in delivering the answer, the question posed may have allowed her to infer
that the young man was looking for a hat, a yellow hat in particular. Then the
answer may be followed by she saying; “ . . . but I do have hats with different
colours including ones not currently displayed.” That is, while she denies the
presence of a yellow hat, she still presumes the availability of hats of which she
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reckons he would like to learn. It does not appear so unrealistic to suppose such
a thought of hers that he may be ready to compromise his preference for a yel-
low hat with some non-yellow one, possibly an orange one in stock, given its
comparative closeness in hue to yellow.
Now, what if the young man turned out to be a town-famous collector of yel-
low articles? Then it may be that from his question she had divined instead that
he was looking for something yellow, a yellow hat in particular, in which case
her answer could have been a contracted form of “No, I do not have it in stock,
but I do have a yellow shirt nonetheless (as you are looking after, I suppose?)”
Either way, these somewhat-appearing-to-be partial negations contrast with
the classical negation with which her answer can be interpreted only as that she
does not have a yellow hat, nothing less, nothing more, with no restriction in the
range of possibilities outside it.
The explanation that I wish to provide is that in the first case she actually
means Hat ⋗ ¬Yellow, presuming the main concept Hat but negating Yellow as
its attribute in a different domain of discourse in which its attributes can be
discussed; and in the second case she actually means Yellow ⋗ ¬Hat with the
main concept Yellow presumed but Hat denied as its attribute. Like this manner,
gradual classical logic that I propose here can capture partial negation, which is
known as contrariety in the pre-Fregean term logic from the Aristotle’s era [16],
as well as nowadays more orthodox contradictory negation. Here we illustrated
attribute negation. Complementary, we may also consider object negation of the
kind ¬Hat⋗Yellow, as well as more orthodox negation of the sort ¬(Hat⋗Yellow)
which I call attributed-object negation.
My purpose is to assume attributed concepts/objects5 as primitive entities and
5In the rest I simply write attributed objects, assuming that it is clear that we do not strongly
distinguish the two terms in the context of this work.
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to analyse the logical behaviour of ⋗ in interaction with the other familiar con-
nectives in classical logic. In this logic, the sense of ‘truth’, a very fundamental
property of classical logic, gradually shifts6 by domains of discourse moving
deeper into attributes of (attributed) objects. As for inconsistency, if there is
an inconsistent argument within a discourse on attributed objects, wherever it
may be that it is occurring, the reasoning part of which is inconsistent cannot be
said to be consistent. For this reason it remains in gradual classical logic just as
strong as is in standard classical logic.
1.1. Structure of this work. Shown below is the organisation of this work.
The basic conceptual core is formed in Section 1, Section 2, which is put into
formal semantics in Section 3. Decidability of the logic is proved in Section
4. After the foundation is laid down, more advanced observations will be made
about the object-attribute relation. They will be found in Section 5. Section 6
concludes with prospects.
• Development of gradual classical logic (Sections 1 and Section 2).
• A formal semantics of gradual classical logic and a proof that it is not para-
consistent/inconsistent (Section 3).
• Decidability of gradual classical logic (Section 4).
• Advanced materials: the notion of recognition cut-offs, and an alternative pre-
sentation of gradual classical logic (Section 5).
• Conclusion (Section 6).
§2. Gradual Classical Logic: Logical Particulars. In this section we shall
look into logical particulars of gradual classical logic. Some familiarity with
6This should not be confused with the idea of many truths in a single domain of discourse [15, 13].
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propositional classical logic, in particular with how the logical connectives be-
have, is presumed. Mathematical transcriptions of gradual classical logic are
found in the next section.
2.1. Logical connective for object/attribute and interactions with nega-
tion. We shall dedicate the symbol ⋗ to represent the object-attribute relation.
The usage of the new connective is fixed to take the form Object1 ⋗ Object2. It
denotes an attributed object. Object1 is more generic an object than Object1 ⋗
Object2 (Object2 acting as an attribute to Object1 makes Object1 more specific).
The schematic reading is as follows: “It is true that Object1 is, and it is true that
it has Object2 as its attribute.” Now, this really is a short-form of the following
expression: “It is true by some sense of truth X reigning over the domain of
discourse discussing Object1 that Object1 is judged existing in the domain of
discourse,7 and it is true by some sense of truth Y reigning over the domain of
discourse discussing Object2 as an attribute to Object1 that Object1 is judged
having Object2 as its attribute.” Also, this reading is what is meant when we
say that “It is true that Object1 ⋗ Object2 is,” where the sense of the truth Z
judging this statement has relation to X and Y, in order for compatibility. I take
these side-remarks for granted in the rest without explicit stipulation. Given an
attributed object Object1⋗Ojbect2, ¬(Object1⋗Object2) expresses its attributed
object negation, ¬Object1 ⋗Object2 its object negation and Object1 ⋗ ¬Object2
its attribute negation. Again the schematic readings for them are, respectively;
• It is false that Object1 ⋗Object2 is.
• It is false that Object1 is, but it is true that some non-Object1 is which has an
attribute of Object2.
• It is true that Object1 is, but it is false that it has an attribute of Object2.
7As must be the case, a domain of discourse defines what can be talked about, which itself does
not dictate that all the elements that are found in the domain are judged existing.
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The presence of negation flips “It is true that . . . ” into “It is false that . . .
” and vice versa. But it should be also noted how negation acts in attribute
negations and object/attribute negations. Several specific examples constructed
parodically from the items in the hat shop episode are;
1. Hat⋗Yellow: It is true that hat is, and it is true that it has the attribute of being
yellow (that is, it is yellow).
2. Yellow⋗Hat: It is true that yellow is, and it is true that it has hat as its attribute.
3. Hat⋗ ¬Yellow: It is true that hat is, but it is false that it is yellow.
4. ¬Hat⋗Yellow: It is false that hat is, but it is true that yellow object (which is
not hat) is.
5. ¬(Hat⋗ Yellow): Either it is false that hat is, or if it is true that hat is, then it
is false that it is yellow.
2.2. Object/attribute relation and conjunction. We examine specific ex-
amples first involving ⋗ and ∧ (conjunction), and then observe what the readings
imply.
1. Hat⋗ (Green ∧ Brooch): It is true that hat is, and it is true that it is green and
brooched.
2. (Hat⋗Green)∧ (Hat⋗Brooch): for one, it is true that hat is, and it is true that
it is green; for one, it is true that hat is, and it is true that it is brooched.
3. (Hat ∧ Shirt) ⋗ Yellow: It is true that hat and shirt are, and it is true that they
are yellow.
4. (Hat ⋗ Yellow) ∧ (Shirt ⋗ Yellow): for one, it is true that hat is, and it is true
that it is yellow; for one, it is true that shirt is, and it is true that it is yellow.
By now it has hopefully become clear that by existential facts as truths I do not
mean how many of a given (attributed) object exist: in gradual classical logic,
cardinality of objects (Cf. Linear Logic [12]) is not what it must be responsible
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for, but only the facts themselves of whether any of them exist in a given do-
main of discourse, which is in line with classical logic.8 Hence they univocally
assume a singular rather than a plural form, as in the examples inscribed so far.
The first and the second, and the third and the fourth, then equate.9 Neverthe-
less, it is still important that we analyse them with a sufficient precision. In the
third and the fourth where the same attribute is shared among several objects,
the attribute of being yellow ascribes to all of them. Therefore those expressions
are a true statement only if (1) there is an existential fact that both hat and shirt
are and (2) being yellow is true for the existential fact (formed by existence of
hat and that of shirt). Another example is in Figure 1.
Brooch Shirt Hat
Large Yellow Hat
(Object)
(Attribute)
( ⋗)
FIGURE 1. Illustration of an expression ((Brooch ∧ Shirt) ⋗
Large) ∧ ((Brooch ∧ Shirt ∧ Hat) ⋗ Yellow) ∧ (Hat ⋗ Hat): the
existential fact of the attribute large depends on the existential
facts of brooch and shirt; the existential fact of the attribute of
being yellow depends on the existential facts of brooch, shirt
and hat; and the existential fact of the attribute hat depends on
the existential fact of hat to which it is an attribute.
2.3. Object/attribute relation and disjunction. We look at examples first.
1. Hat⋗ (Hat ∨ Brooch): It is true that hat is, and it is true that it is either hatted
or brooched.
2. (Hat⋗ Hat) ∨ (Hat ⋗ Brooch): At least either that it is true that hat is and it is
true that it is hatted, or that it is true that hat is and it is true that it is brooched.
8 That proposition A is true and that proposition A is true mean that proposition A is true; the
subject of this sentence is equivalent to the object of its.
9I will also touch upon an alternative interpretation in Section 5, as an advanced material: just
as there are many modal logics with a varying degree of strength of modalities, so does it seem
that more than one interpretations about ⋗ in interaction with the other logical connectives can
be studied.
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3. (Hat∨ Shirt)⋗Yellow: It is true that at least either hat or shirt is, and it is true
that whichever is existing (or both) is (or are) yellow.
4. (Hat⋗ Yellow) ∨ (Shirt⋗ Yellow): At least either it is true that hat is and it is
true that it is yellow, or it is true that shirt is and it is true that it is yellow.
Just as in the previous sub-section, here again 1) and 2), and 3) and 4) are equiv-
alent. However, in the cases of 3) and 4), we have that the existential fact of the
attribute yellow depends on that of hat or shirt, whichever is existing, or that of
both if they both exist.10
2.4. Nestings of object/attribute relations. An expression of the kind
(Object1 ⋗ Object2) ⋗ Object3 is ambiguous. But we begin by listing examples
and then move onto analysis of the readings of the nesting of the relations.
1. (Hat⋗ Brooch)⋗ Green: It is true that hat is, and it is true that it is brooched.
It is true that the object thus described is green.
2. Hat⋗ (Hat⋗White): It is true that hat is, and it is true that it has the attribute
of which it is true that hat is and that it is white. (More simply, it is true that
hat is, and it is true that it is white-hatted.)
3. ¬(Hat ⋗ Yellow) ⋗ Brooch: Either it is false that hat is, or else it is true that
hat is but it is false that it is yellow.11 If it is false that hat is, then it is true
that brooched object (which obviously cannot be hat) is. If it is true that hat
is but it is false that it is yellow, then it is true that the object thus described
is brooched.
Note that to say that Hat ⋗ Brooch (brooched hat) is being green, we must mean
to say that the object to the attribute of being green, i.e. hat, is green. It is on
the other hand unclear if green brooched hat should or should not mean that the
brooch, an accessory to hat, is also green. But common sense about adjectives
10In classical logic, that proposition A or proposition B is true means that at least one of the
proposition A or the proposition B is true though both can be true. Same goes here.
11 This is the reading of ¬(Hat⋗ Yellow).
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dictates that such be simply indeterminate. It is reasonable for (Hat ⋗ Brooch)
⋗ Green, while if we have (Hat ⋗ Large) ⋗ Green, ordinarily speaking it cannot
be the case that the attribute of being large is green. Therefore we enforce that
(Object1 ⋗ Object2) ⋗ Object3 amounts to (Object1 ⋗ Object3) ∧ ((Object1 ⋗
Object2)∨(Object1⋗(Object2⋗Object3))) in which disjunction as usual captures
the indeterminacy. No ambiguity is posed in 2), and 3) is understood in the same
way as 1).
2.5. Two nullary logical connectives. Now we examine the nullary logical
connectives ⊤ and ⊥ which denote, in classical logic, the concept of the truth
and that of the inconsistency. In gradual classical logic ⊤ denotes the concept
of the presence and ⊥ denotes that of the absence. Several examples for the
readings are;
1. ⊤⋗ Yellow: It is true that yellow object is.
2. Hat⋗ (⊤⋗Yellow): It is true that hat is, and it is true that it has the following
attribute of which it is true that it is yellow object.
3. ⊥⋗ Yellow: It is true that nothingness is, and it is true that it is yellow.
4. Hat⋗⊤: It is true that hat is.
5. Hat⋗⊥: It is true that hat is, and it is true that it has no attributes.
6. ⊥⋗⊥: It is true that nothingness is, and it is true that it has no attributes.
It is illustrated in 1) and 2) how the sense of the ‘truth’ is delimited by the object
to which it acts as an attribute. For the rest, however, there is a point which is
not so vacuous as not to merit a consideration, and to which I in fact append the
following postulate.
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POSTULATE 1. That which does not have any attribute cannot be distinguished
from nothingness for which any scenario where it comes with an attribute is in-
conceivable. Conversely, anything that remains once all the attributes have been
removed from a given object is nothingness.
With it, the item 3) which asserts the existence of nothingness is contradic-
tory. The item 4) then behaves as expected in that Hat which is asserted with
the presence of attribute(s) is just as generic a term as Hat itself is. The item 5)
which asserts the existence of an object with no attributes again contradicts Pos-
tulate 1. The item 6) illustrates that any attributed object in some part of which
has turned out to be contradictory remains contradictory no matter how it is to
be extended: a ⊥ cannot negate another ⊥. Cf. the footnote 2 for the plausibility
of the postulate.
§3. Mathematical mappings: syntax and semantics. In this section a se-
mantics of gradual classical logic is formalised. We assume in the rest of this
document;
• N denotes the set of natural numbers including 0.
• ∧† and ∨† are two binary operators on Boolean arithmetic. The following laws
hold; 1∨† 1 = 1 ∨† 0 = 0∨† 1 = 1, 0∧† 0 = 0∧† 1 = 1 ∧† 0 = 0, 1∧† 1 = 1, and
0 ∨† 0 = 0.
• ∧†, ∨† →†, ¬†, ∃ and ∀ are meta-logical connectives: conjunction, disjunc-
tion,12 material implication, negation, existential quantification and universal
quantification, whose semantics follow those of standard classical logic. We
abbreviate (A→† B) ∧† (B →† A) by A↔† B.
12 These two symbols are overloaded. Save whether truth values or the ternary values are supplied
as arguments, however, the distinction is clear from the context in which they are used.
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• Binding strength of logical or meta-logical connectives is [¬]≫ [∧ ∨]≫ [⋗] ≫
[∀ ∃]≫ [¬†]≫ [∧† ∨†]≫ [→†]≫ [↔†] in the order of decreasing precedence.
Those that belong to the same group are assumed having the same precedence.
• For any binary connectives ?, for any i, j ∈ N and for !0, !1, · · · , !j that are some
recognisable entities, ?ji=0!i is an abbreviation of
(!0)?(!1)? · · ·?(!j).
• For the unary connective ¬, ¬¬! for some recognisable entity ! is an abbrevia-
tion of ¬(¬!). Further, ¬k! for some k ∈ N and some recognisable entity ! is an
abbreviation of ¬ · · · ¬︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
!.
• For the binary connective ⋗, !0⋗!1⋗!2 for some three recognisable entities is
an abbreviation of !0 ⋗ (!1⋗!2).
On this preamble we shall begin.
3.1. Development of semantics. The set of literals in gradual classical logic
is denoted by A whose elements are referred to by a with or without a sub-script.
This set has a countably many number of literals. Given a literal a ∈ A, its
complement is denoted by ac which is in A. As usual, we have ∀a ∈ A.(ac)c = a.
The set A ∪ {⊤} ∪ {⊥} where ⊤ and ⊥ are the two nullary logical connectives
is denoted by S. Its elements are referred to by s with or without a sub-script.
Given s ∈ S, its complement is denoted by sc which is in S. Here we have
⊤c = ⊥ and ⊥c = ⊤. The set of formulas is denoted by F whose elements, F
with or without a sub-/super-script, are finitely constructed from the following
grammar;
F := s | F ∧ F | F ∨ F | ¬F | F ⋗ F
We now develop semantics. This is done in two parts: we do not outright jump to
the definition of valuation (which we could, but which we simply do not choose
for succinctness of the proofs of the main results). Instead, just as we only need
consider negation normal form in classical logic because every classical logic
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formula definable has a reduction into a normal form, so shall we first define
rules for formula reductions (for any F1, F2, F3 ∈ F):
• ∀s ∈ S.¬s 7→ sc (¬ reduction 1).
• ¬(F1 ∧ F2) 7→ ¬F1 ∨ ¬F2 (¬ reduction 2).
• ¬(F1 ∨ F2) 7→ ¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 (¬ reduction 3).
• ¬(s⋗ F2) 7→ sc ∨ (s⋗ ¬F2) (¬ reduction 4).
• (F1 ⋗ F2)⋗ F3 7→ (F1 ⋗ F3) ∧ ((F1 ⋗ F2) ∨ (F1 ⋗ F2 ⋗ F3)) (⋗ reduction 1).
• (F1 ∧ F2)⋗ F3 7→ (F1 ⋗ F3) ∧ (F2 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 2).
• (F1 ∨ F2)⋗ F3 7→ (F1 ⋗ F3) ∨ (F2 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 3).
• F1 ⋗ (F2 ∧ F3) 7→ (F1 ⋗ F2) ∧ (F1 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 4).
• F1 ⋗ (F2 ∨ F3) 7→ (F1 ⋗ F2) ∨ (F1 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 5).
DEFINITION 1 (Domain function/valuation frame). Let S∗ denote the set
union of (A) the set of finite sequences of elements of S and (B) a singleton
set {ǫ} denoting an empty sequence. We define a domain function D : S∗ → 2S .
We define a valuation frame as a 2-tuple: (I, J), where I : S∗ × S → {0, 1} is
what we call local interpretation and J : S∗\{ǫ} → {0, 1} is what we call gloal
interpretation. The following are defined to satisfy for all k ∈ N and for all
s0, . . . , sk ∈ S.
Regarding domains of discourse:
• For all s∗ ∈ S∗, D(s∗) is closed under complementation, and has at least ⊤
and ⊥.
Regarding local interpretations:
• [I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1,⊤) = 1]13 (I valuation of ⊤).
• [I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1,⊥) = 0] (That of ⊥).
13Simply for a presentation purpose, we use a dot such as s∗1.s∗2 for s∗1, s∗2 ∈ S∗ to show that
s∗1.s
∗
2 is an element of S∗ in which s∗1 is the preceding constituent and s∗2 the following con-
stituent of s∗1.s∗2 . When k = 0, we assume that s0.s1. . . . .sk−1 = ǫ. Same applies in the
rest.
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• ∀ak ∈ D(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1).[I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, ak) = 0]∨†
[I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, ak) = 1] (That of a literal).
• ∀ak ∈ D(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1).[I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, ak) = 0]↔†
[I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, a
c
k) = 1] (That of a complement).
• [I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, sk) = I(s′0.s
′
1. . . . .s
′
k−1, sk)] (Synchronization condition on I
interpretation; this reflects the dependency of the existential fact of an at-
tribute to the existential fact of objects to which it is an attribute).
Regarding global interpretations:
• [J(s0.s1. . . . .sk) = 1]↔† ∀i ∈ N.
∧†k
i=0[I(s0.s1. . . . .si−1, si) = 1]
(Non-contradictory J valuation).
• [J(s0.s1. . . . .sk) = 0]↔† ∃i ∈ N.[i ≤ k] ∧† [I(s0.s1. . . . .si−1, si) = 0]
(Contradictory J valuation).
Note that the global interpretation is completely characterised by the local inter-
pretation. What we will need in the end are global interpretations; local inter-
pretations are for intermediate value calculations for the ease of presentation of
the semantics and of proofs of the main results. In the rest, we assume that any
literal that appears in a formula is in a domain of discourse.
DEFINITION 2 (Valuation). Suppose a valuation frame M = (I, J). The fol-
lowing are defined to hold for all F1, F2 ∈ F and for all k ∈ N:
• [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk] = J(s0.s1. . . . .sk).
• [M |= F1 ∧ F2] = [M |= F1] ∧† [M |= F2].
• [M |= F1 ∨ F2] = [M |= F1] ∨† [M |= F2].
The notions of validity and satisfiability are as usual.
DEFINITION 3 (Validity/Satisfiability). A formula F ∈ F is said to be satis-
fiable in a valuation frame M iff 1 = [M |= F ]; it is said to be valid iff it is
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satisfiable for all the valuation frames; it is said to be invalid iff 0 = [M |= F ]
for some valuation frame M; it is said to be unsatisfiable iff it is invalid for all
the valuation frames.
3.2. Study on the semantics. We have not yet formally verified some im-
portant points. Are there, firstly, any formulas F ∈ F that do not reduce into
some value-assignable formula? Secondly, what if both 1 = [M |= F ] and
1 = [M |= ¬F ], or both 0 = [M |= F ] and 0 = [M |= ¬F ] for some F ∈ F under
some M? Thirdly, should it happen that [M |= F ] = 0 = 1 for any formula F ,
given a valuation frame?
If the first should hold, the semantics - the reductions and valuations as were
presented in the previous sub-section - would not assign a value (values) to every
member of F even with the reduction rules made available. If the second should
hold, we could gain 1 = [M |= F ∧¬F ], which would relegate this gradual logic
to a family of para-consistent logics - quite out of keeping with my intention.
And the third should never hold, clearly.
Hence it must be shown that these unfavoured situations do not arise. An
outline to the completion of the proofs is;
1. to establish that every formula has a reduction through ¬ and ⋗ reductions
into some formula F for which it holds that ∀M.[M |= F ] ∈ {0, 1}, to settle
down the first inquiry.
2. to prove that any formula F to which a value 0/1 is assignable without
the use of the reduction rules satisfies for every valuation frame (a) that
[M |= F ] ∨† [M |= ¬F ] = 1 and [M |= F ] ∧† [M |= ¬F ] = 0; and (b) either
that 0 6= 1 = [M |= F ] or that 1 6= 0 = [M |= F ], to settle down the other
inquiries partially.
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3. to prove that the reduction through ¬ reductions and ⋗ reductions on any
formula F ∈ F is normal in that, in whatever order those reduction rules
are applied to F , any Freduced in the set of possible formulas it reduces into
satisfies for every valuation frame either that [M |= Freduced] = 1, or that
[M |= Freduced] = 0, for all such Freduced, to conclude.
3.2.1. Every formula is 0/1-assignable. We state several definitions for the
first objective of ours.
DEFINITION 4 (Chains/Unit chains/Unit chain expansion). A chain is defined
to be any formula F ∈ F such that F = F0 ⋗ F1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ Fk+1 for k ∈ N. A unit
chain is defined to be a chain for which Fi ∈ S for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. We denote
the set of unit chains by U. By the head of a chain Fa ⋗ Fb ∈ F, we mean Fa;
and by the tail Fb. and by the tail some formula Fa ∈ F satisfying (1) that Fa is
not in the form Fb ⋗ Fc for some Fb, Fc ∈ F and (2) that F = Fa ⋗ Fd for some
Fd ∈ F. By the tail of a chain F ∈ F, we then mean some formula Fd ∈ F such
that F = Fa ⋗ Fd for some Fa as the head of F . Given any F ∈ F, we say that F
is expanded in unit chains only if any chain that occurs in F is a unit chain.
DEFINITION 5 (Formua length). Let us define a function as follows.
• ∀s ∈ S.f len(s) = 1.
• ∀F1, F2 ∈ F.f len(F1 ∧ F2) = f len(F1 ∨ F2) = f len(F1 ⋗ F2) = f len(F1) +
f len(F2) + 1.
• ∀F1 ∈ F.f len(¬F1) = 1 + f len(F1).
Then we define the length of F ∈ F to be f len(F ).
DEFINITION 6 (Maximal number of ¬ nesting). Let us define a function.
• ∀s ∈ S.neg max(F0) = 0.
• ∀F1, F2 ∈ F.neg max(F1∧F2) = neg max(F1∨F2) = neg max(F1⋗F2) =
max(neg max(F1), neg max(F2)).
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• ∀F1 ∈ F.neg max(¬F1) = 1 + neg max(F1).
Then we define the maximal number of ¬ nesting for F ∈ F to be neg max(F ).
We now work on the main results.
LEMMA 1 (Linking principle). Let F1 and F2 be two formulas in unit chain
expansion. Then it holds that F1 ⋗ F2 has a reduction into a formula in unit
chain expansion.
PROOF. Apply ⋗ reductions 2 and 3 on F1 ⋗ F2 into a formula in which the
only occurrences of the chains are f0⋗F2, f1⋗F2, . . . , fk ⋗F2 for some k ∈ N
and some f0, f1, . . . , fk ∈ U ∪ S. Then apply ⋗ reductions 4 and 5 to each of
those chains into a formula in which the only occurrences of the chains are:
f0 ⋗ g0, f0 ⋗ g1, . . . , f0 ⋗ gj, f1 ⋗ g0, . . . , f1 ⋗ gj , . . . , fk ⋗ g0, . . . , fk ⋗ gj for
some j ∈ N and some g0, g1, . . . , gj ∈ U. To each such chain, apply ⋗ reduction
1 as long as it is applicable. This process cannot continue infinitely since any
formula is finitely constructed and finitely branching by any reduction rule, and
since, on the assumptions, we can apply induction on the number of elements
of S occurring in gx, 0 ≤ x ≤ j. The straightforward inductive proof is left to
readers. The result is a formula in unit chain expansion. ⊣
LEMMA 2 (Reduction without negation). Any formula F0 ∈ F in which no ¬
occurs reduces into some formula in unit chain expansion.
PROOF. By induction on the formula length. For inductive cases, consider
what F0 actually is:
1. F0 = F1 ∧ F2 or F0 = F1 ∨ F2: Apply induction hypothesis on F1 and F2.
2. F0 = F1⋗F2: Apply induction hypothesis on F1 and F2 to get F ′1⋗F ′2 where
F ′1 and F ′2 are formulas in unit chain expansion. Then apply Lemma 1.
⊣
18
LEMMA 3 (Reduction). Any formula F0 ∈ F reduces into some formula in
unit chain expansion.
PROOF. By induction on the maximal number of ¬ nesting, and a
sub-induction on the formula length. We quote Lemma 2 for the base cases.
For the inductive cases, assume that the current lemma holds true for all the for-
mulas with neg max(F0) of up to k. Then we conclude by showing that it still
holds true for all the formulas with neg max(F0) of k + 1. Now, because any
formula is finitely constructed, there exist sub-formulas in which occur no ¬.
By Lemma 2, those sub-formulas have a reduction into a formula in unit chain
expansion. Hence it suffices to show that those formulas ¬F ′ with F ′ already in
unit chain expansion reduce into a formula in unit chain expansion, upon which
inductive hypothesis applies for a conclusion. Consider what F ′ is:
1. s: then apply ¬ reduction 1 on ¬F ′ to remove the ¬ occurrence.
2. Fa ∧Fb: apply ¬ reduction 2. Then apply induction hypothesis on ¬Fa and
¬Fb.
3. Fa ∨Fb: apply ¬ reduction 3. Then apply induction hypothesis on ¬Fa and
¬Fb.
4. s⋗ F ∈ U: apply ¬ reduction 4. Then apply induction hypothesis on ¬F .
⊣
LEMMA 4. For any F ∈ F in unit chain expansion, there exists v ∈ {0, 1}
such that [M |= F ] = v for any valuation frame.
PROOF. Since a value 0/1 is assignable to any element of S ∪ U by Definition
2, it is (or they are if more than one in {0, 1}) assignable to [M |= F ]. ⊣
Hence we obtain the desired result for the first objective.
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PROPOSITION 1. To any F ∈ F corresponds at least one formula Fa in unit
chain expansion into which F reduces. It holds for any such Fa that [M |= Fa] ∈
{0, 1} for any valuation frame.
For the next sub-section, the following observation about the negation on a unit
chain comes in handy. Let us state a procedure.
DEFINITION 7 (Procedure recursiveReduce).
The procedure given below takes as an input a formula F in unit chain expan-
sion.14 Description of recursiveReduce(F : F)
1. Replace ∧ in F with ∨, and ∨ with ∧. These two operations are simultaneous.
2. Replace all the non-chains s ∈ S in F simultaneously with sc (∈ S).
3. For every chain Fa in F with its head s ∈ S for some s and its tail Ftail,
replace Fa with (sc ∨ (s⋗ (recursiveReduce(Ftail)))).
4. Reduce F via ⋗ reductions in unit chain expansion.
Then we have the following result.
PROPOSITION 2 (Reduction of negated unit chain expansion). Let F be a for-
mula in unit chain expansion. Then ¬F reduces via the ¬ and ⋗ reductions into
recursiveReduce(F ). Moreover recursiveReduce(F ) is the unique reduction of
¬F .
PROOF. For the uniqueness, observe that only ¬ reductions and ⋗ reduction
5 are used in the reduction of ¬F , and that at any point during the reduction,
if there occurs a sub-formula in the form ¬Fx, the sub-formula Fx cannot be
reduced by any reduction rules. Then the proof of the uniqueness is straightfor-
ward. ⊣
14Instead of stating in lambda calculus, we aim to be more descriptive in this work for not-so-
trivial a function or a procedure, using a pseudo program.
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3.2.2. Unit chain expansions form a Boolean algebra. We make use of dis-
junctive normal form in this sub-section for a simplification of proofs.
DEFINITION 8 (Disjunctive/Conjunctive normal form). A formula F ∈ F is
defined to be in disjunctive normal form only if ∃i, j, k ∈ N ∃h0, · · · , hi ∈ N
∃f00, . . . , fkhk ∈ U∪S.F = ∨
k
i=0∧
hi
j=0fij . Dually, a formula F ∈ F is defined to be
in conjunctive normal form only if ∃i, j, k ∈ N ∃h0, · · · , hi ∈ N ∃f00, . . . , fkhk ∈
U ∪ S.F = ∧ki=0 ∨
hi
j=0 fij .
Now, for the second objective of ours, we prove that U∪S, recursiveReduce, ∨†
and ∧† form a Boolean algebra,15 from which follows the required outcome.
PROPOSITION 3 (Annihilation/Identity). For any formula F in unit chain ex-
pansion and for any valuation frame, it holds (1) that [M |= ⊤∧ F ] = [M |= F ];
(2) that [M |= ⊤ ∨ F ] = [M |= ⊤]; (3) that [M |= ⊥ ∧ F ] = [M |= ⊥]; and (4)
that [M |= ⊥ ∨ F ] = [M |= F ].
LEMMA 5 (Elementary complementation). For any s0⋗ s1⋗ · · ·⋗ sk ∈ U∪S
for some k ∈ N, if for a given valuation frame it holds that [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗
· · · ⋗ sk] = 1, then it also holds that [M |= recursiveReduce(s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗
sk)] = 0; or if it holds that [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk] = 0, then it holds that
[M |= recursiveReduce(s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk)] = 1. These two events are mutually
exclusive.
PROOF. For the first one, [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk] = 1 implies that I(ǫ, s0)=
I(s0, s1) = . . . = I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, sk) = 1. So we have; I(ǫ, sc0)= I(s0, sc1)= . . .=
I(s0.s1 . . . .sk−1, s
c
k)=0 by the definition of I. Meanwhile, recursiveReduce(s0 ⋗
s1⋗· · ·⋗sk) = sc0∨(s0⋗((s
c
1∨(s1⋗· · · )))) = s
c
0∨(s0⋗s
c
1)∨(s⋗s1⋗s
c
2)∨· · ·∨(s⋗
s1⋗· · ·⋗sk−1⋗sck). Therefore [M |= recursiveReduce(s0⋗s1⋗· · ·⋗sk)] = 0 6= 1
15http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean algebra for the laws of Boolean algebra.
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for the given valuation frame.
For the second obligation, [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk] = 0 implies that [I(ǫ, s0) =
0] ∨† [I(s0, s1) = 0] ∨† · · · ∨† [I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, sk) = 0]. Again by the definition
of I, we have the required result. That these two events are mutually exclusive is
trivial. ⊣
PROPOSITION 4 (Associativity/Commutativity/Distributivity). Given any for-
mulas F1, F2, F3 ∈ F in unit chain expansion and any valuation frame M, the
following hold:
1. [M |= F1]∧†([M |= F2]∧† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1]∧† [M |= F2])∧† [M |= F3]
(associativity 1).
2. [M |= F1] ∨† ([M |= F2] ∨† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1] ∨† [M |= F2]) ∨† F3
(associativity 2).
3. [M |= F1] ∧† [M |= F2] = [M |= F2] ∧† [M |= F1] (commutativity 1).
4. [M |= F1] ∨† [M |= F2] = [M |= F2] ∨† [M |= F1] (commutativity 2).
5. [M |= F1] ∧† ([M |= F2] ∨† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1] ∧† [M |= F2]) ∨†
([M |= F1] ∧
† [M |= F3]) (distributivity 1).
6. [M |= F1] ∨† ([M |= F2] ∧† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1] ∨† [M |= F2]) ∧†
([M |= F1] ∨† [M |= F3]) (distributivity 2).
PROOF. Make use of Lemma 5 to note that each [M |= f ] for f ∈ U ∪ S is as-
signed one and only one value v ∈ {0, 1}. Straightforward with the observation.
⊣
PROPOSITION 5 (Idempotence and Absorption). Given any formula
F1, F2 ∈ F in unit chain expansion, for any valuation frame it holds that [M |=
F1] ∧
† [M |= F1] = [M |= F1] ∨
† [M |= F1] = [M |= F1] (idempotence); and that
[M |= F1] ∧† ([M |= F1] ∨† [M |= F2]) = [M |= F1] ∨† ([M |= F1] ∧† [M |= F2]) =
[M |= F1] (absorption).
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PROOF. Both F1, F2 are assigned one and only one value v ∈ {0, 1}. Trivial
to verify. ⊣
We now prove the laws involving recursiveReduce.
LEMMA 6 (Elementary double negation). Let F denote s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk ∈
U ∪ S for some k ∈ N. Then for any valuation frame it holds that [M |= F ] =
[M |= recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F ))].
PROOF. recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F )) = recursiveReduce(sc0∨
(s0⋗s
c
1)∨· · ·∨(s0⋗s1⋗· · ·⋗sk−1⋗s
c
k)) = s0∧(s
c
0∨(s0⋗s1))∧(s
c
0∨(s0⋗s
c
1)∨(s0⋗
s1⋗s2))∧· · ·∧(sc0∨(s0⋗s
c
1)∨· · ·∨(s0⋗s1⋗· · ·⋗sk−2⋗s
c
k−1)∨(s0⋗s1⋗· · ·⋗sk)).
Here, assume that the right hand side of the equation which is in conjunctive
normal form is ordered, the number of terms, from left to right, strictly in-
creasing from 1 to k + 1. Then as the result of a transformation of the con-
junctive normal form into disjunctive normal form we will have 1 (the choice
from the first conjunctive clause which contains only one term s0) × 2 (a choice
from the second conjunctive clause with 2 terms sc0 and s0 ⋗ s1) × . . . × (k
+ 1) clauses. But almost all the clauses in [M |= (the disjunctive normal form)]
will be assigned 0 (trivial; the proof left to readers) so that we gain [M |=
(the disjunctive normal form)] = [M |= s0] ∧† [M |= s0 ⋗ s1] ∧† · · · ∧† [M |=
s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk] = [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk]. ⊣
PROPOSITION 6 (Complementation/Double negation).
For any F in unit chain expansion and for any valuation frame, we have 1 =
[M |= F ∨ recursiveReduce(F )] and that 0 = [M |= F ∧ recursiveReduce(F )]
(complementation). Also, for any F ∈ F in unit chain expansion and for any val-
uation frame we have [M |= F ] = [M |= recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F ))]
(double negation).
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PROOF. By Proposition 4, F has a disjunctive normal form: F = ∨ki=0
∧hi
j=0 fij
for some i, j, k ∈ N, some h0, · · · , hk ∈ N and some
f00, · · · , fkhk ∈ U ∪ S. Then we have that;
recursiveReduce(F ) =
∧k
i=0
∨hi
j=0 recursiveReduce(fij),
which, if transformed into a disjunctive normal form, will have
(h0 + 1) [a choice from recursiveReduce(f00), recursiveReduce(f01), . . . ,
recursiveReduce(f0h0)] × (h1 + 1) [a choice from recursiveReduce(f10),
recursiveReduce(f11), . . . , recursiveReduce(f1h1)]× · · ·× (hk+1) clauses. Now
if [M |= F ] = 1, then we already have the required result. Therefore suppose
that [M |= F ] = 0. Then it holds that ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k}.∃j ∈ {0, . . . , hi}.([M |=
fij ] = 0). By Lemma 5, this is equivalent to saying that ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k}.∃j ∈
{0, . . . , hi}.([M |= recursiveReduce(fij)] = 1). But then a clause in disjunctive
normal form of [M |= recursiveReduce(F )] exists, which is assigned 1. Dually
for 0 = [M |= F ∧ recursiveReduce(F )].
For [M |= F ] = [M |= recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F ))], by Proposi-
tion 4, F has a disjunctive normal form: F = ∨ki=0
∧hi
j=0 fij for some i, j, k ∈ N,
some h0, . . . , hk ∈ N and some f00, . . . , fkhk ∈ U ∪ S. Then;
recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F )) =
∨k
i=0
∧hi
j=0 recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(fij)).
But by Lemma 6 [M |= recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(fij))] = [M |= fij ]
for each appropriate i and j. Straightforward. ⊣
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THEOREM 1. Denote by X the set of the expressions comprising all [M |= fx]
for fx ∈ U ∪ S. Then for every valuation frame, it holds that
(X, recursiveReduce,∧†,∨†) defines a Boolean algebra.
PROOF. Follows from earlier propositions and lemmas. ⊣
3.2.3. Gradual classical logic is neither para-consistent nor inconsistent. To
achieve the last objective we assume several notations.
DEFINITION 9 (Sub-formula notation). Given a formula F ∈ F, we denote
by F [Fa] the fact that Fa occurs as a sub-formula in F . Here the definition of a
sub-formula of a formula follows that which is found in standard textbooks on
mathematical logic [18]. F itself is a sub-formula of F .
DEFINITION 10 (Small step reductions). By F1 ❀ F2 for some formulas F1
and F2 we denote that F1 reduces in one reduction step into F2. By F1 ❀r F2
we denote that the reduction holds explicitly by a reduction rule r (which is
either of the 7 rules). By F1 ❀∗ F2 we denote that F1 reduces into F2 in a finite
number of steps including 0 step in which case F1 is said to be irreducible. By
F1 ❀
k F2 we denote that the reduction is in exactly k steps. By F1 ❀∗{r1,r2,··· } F2
or F1 ❀
k
{r1,r2,··· }
F2 we denote that the reduction is via those specified rules
r1, r2, · · · only.
DEFINITION 11 (Formula size). Let us define a function that outputs a posi-
tive rational number, as follows. The A: B notation derives from programming
practice, but simply says that A is a member of B.
Description of f size(d : N, l : N, bool : Boolean, F : F) outputting a positive
rational number
1. If F = s for some s ∈ S, then return 1/4l.
2. If F = ¬F1 for F1 ∈ F, then return (1/4d) + f size(d, l, bool, F1).
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3. If F = F1⋗F2, then return f size(d+1, l, bool, F1)+ f size(d+1, l, bool, F2).
4. If F = F1 ∧ F2 or F = F1 ∨ F2, then
(a) If bool is true, return max(f size(d+ 1, l+ 1, false, F1), f size(d+ 1, l+
1, false, F2)).
(b) Otherwise, return max(f size(d, l, false, F1), f size(d, l, false, F2)).
Then we define the size of F to be f size(0, 0, true, F ).
The purpose of the last definition, including the choice of 1/4l, is just so that
the formula size at each formula reduction does not increase. There is a one-to-
one mapping between all the numbers as may be returned by this function and
a subset of N. Other than for the stated purpose, there is no rationale behind the
particular decisions in the definition. Readers should not try to figure any deeper
intuition, for there is none.
PROPOSITION 7 (Preliminary observation). The following results hold. b ∈
{true, false}.
1. f size(d, l, b,¬s) ≥ f size(d, l, b, sc).
2. f size(d, l, b,¬(F1 ∧ F2)) ≥ f size(d, l, b,¬F1 ∨ ¬F2).
3. f size(d, l, b,¬(F1 ∨ F2)) ≥ f size(d, l, b,¬F1 ∧ ¬F2).
4. f size(d, l, b,¬(s⋗ F2)) ≥ f size(d, l, b, sc ∨ (s⋗ ¬F2)).
5. f size(d, l, b, (F1 ⋗ F2)⋗ F3) ≥
f size(d, l, b, (F1 ⋗ F3) ∧ ((F1 ⋗ F2) ∨ (F1 ⋗ F2 ⋗ F3))).
6. f size(d, l, b, F1 ∧ F2 ⋗ F3) ≥ f size(d, l, b, (F1 ⋗ F3) ∧ (F2 ⋗ F3)).
7. f size(d, l, b, F1 ∨ F2 ⋗ F3) ≥ f size(d, l, b, (F1 ⋗ F3) ∨ (F2 ⋗ F3)).
8. f size(d, l, b, F1 ⋗ F2 ∧ F3) ≥ f size(d, l, b, (F1 ⋗ F2) ∧ (F1 ⋗ F3)).
9. f size(d, l, b, F1 ⋗ F2 ∨ F3) ≥ f size(d, l, b, (F1 ⋗ F2) ∨ (F1 ⋗ F3)).
10. f size(d, l, b, F1 ∧ F2) = f size(d, l, b, F2 ∧ F1).
11. f size(d, l, b, F1 ∨ F2) = f size(d, l, b, F2 ∨ F1).
26
12. f size(d, l, b, (F1 ∧ F2) ∧ F3) = f size(d, l, b, F1 ∧ (F2 ∧ F3)).
13. f size(d, l, b, (F1 ∨ F2) ∨ F3) = f size(d, l, b, F1 ∨ (F2 ∨ F3)).
PROOF. Shown with an assistance of a Java program. The source code and
the test cases are found in Appendix A. ⊣
Along with the above notations, we also enforce that F(F ) denote the set of
formulas in unit chain expansion that F ∈ F can reduce into. A stronger result
than Lemma 2 follows.
THEOREM 2 (Bisimulation). Assumed below are pairs of formulas. F ′ differs
from F only by the shown sub-formulas, i.e. F ′ derives from F by replacing the
shown sub-formula for F ′ with the shown sub-formula for F and vice versa.
Then for each pair (F, F ′) below, it holds for every valuation frame that [M |=
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F1] = [M |= F2] for all F1 ∈ F(F ) and for all F2 ∈ F(F ′).
F [Fa ∧ Fb ⋗ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ∨ Fb ⋗ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∨ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ⋗ Fb ∧ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fb) ∧ (Fa ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ⋗ Fb ∨ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fb) ∨ (Fa ⋗ Fc)]
F [(Fa ⋗ Fb)⋗ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ ((Fa ⋗ Fb) ∨ (Fa ⋗ Fb ⋗ Fc))]
F [¬s] , F ′[sc]
F [¬(F1 ∧ F2)] , F
′[¬F1 ∨ ¬F2]
F [¬(F1 ∨ F2)] , F
′[¬F1 ∧ ¬F2]
F [¬(s⋗ F2)] , F
′[sc ∨ (s⋗ ¬F2)]
F [Fa ∨ Fa] , F
′[Fa]
F [Fa ∧ Fa] , F
′[Fa]
F [Fa ∧ Fb] , F
′[Fb ∧ Fa]
F [Fa ∨ Fb] , F
′[Fb ∨ Fa]
F [Fa ∧ (Fb ∧ Fc)] , F
′[(Fa ∧ Fb) ∧ Fc]
F [Fa ∨ (Fb ∨ Fc)] , F
′[(Fa ∨ Fb) ∨ Fc]
PROOF. By simultaneous induction on the size of the formula that is not a
strict sub-formula of any other formulas16, a sub-induction on the inverse of
(the number of occurrences of ¬ + 1)17 and a sub-sub-induction on the inverse
of (the number of occurrences of ⋗ + 1). None of these are generally an intger;
but there is a mapping into N, so that a larger number maps into a larger natural
number. The composite induction measure strictly decreases at each reduction
16That is, if F ❀ Fa ❀ Fb ❀ . . . , then we get
f size(0, 0, true, F ), f size(0, 0, true, Fa), f size(0, 0, true, Fb)...
17If ¬ occurs once, then we get 1/2. If it occurs twice, then we get 1/3.
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(Cf. Appendix A). We first establish that F(F1) = F(F2) (by bisimulation).
One way to show that to each reduction on F ′ corresponds reduction(s) on F is
straightforward, for we can choose to reduce F into F ′, thereafter synchronizing
both of the reductions. Into the other way to show that to each reduction on F
corresponds reduction(s) on F ′;
1. The first pair.
(a) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula which neither is a sub-
formula of the shown sub-formula nor takes as its sub-formula the
shown sub-formula, then we reduce the same sub-formula in F ′. In-
duction hypothesis on the pair of the reduced formulas. (The formula
size of the stated formulas is that of F in this direction of the proof).
(b) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fa or Fb then we reduce the same
sub-formula of Fa or Fb in F ′. Induction hypothesis.
(c) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fc then we reduce the same sub-
formula of both occurrences of Fc in F ′. Induction hypothesis.
(d) If⋗ reduction 2 takes place on F such that we have; F [(Fa∧Fb)⋗Fc]❀
Fx[(Fa⋗Fc)∧ (Fb⋗Fc)] where F and Fx differ only by the shown sub-
formulas,18 then do nothing on F ′. And Fx = F ′. Vacuous thereafter.
(e) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula Fp of F in which the shown
sub-formula of F occurs as a strict sub-formula (F [(Fa ∧ Fb) ⋗ Fc] =
F [Fp[(Fa∧Fb)⋗Fc]]), then we have F [Fp[(Fa∧Fb)⋗Fc]]❀ Fx[Fq[(Fa∧
Fb)⋗Fc]]. But we have F ′ = F ′[F ′p[(Fa⋗Fc)∧(Fb⋗Fc)]]. Therefore we
apply the same reduction on F ′p to gain; F ′[F ′p[(Fa⋗Fc)∧ (Fb⋗Fc)]]❀
F ′x[F
′
q[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]]. Induction hypothesis.
2. The second pair: Similar.
18This note ‘where . . . ’ is assumed in the remaining.
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3. The third pair: Similar, except when ¬ reduction 4 applies such that we
have; F [¬(s ⋗ Fb ∧ Fc)] ❀ Fp[sc ∨ (s ⋗ ¬(Fb ∧ Fc))]. By the simultaneous
induction and by Proposition 7, it does not cost generality if we replace it
with Fq[sc ∨ (s ⋗ ¬Fb ∨ ¬Fc)] that differs from Fp only by the shown sub-
formulas, which we then replace with Fr[(sc∨sc)∨ ((s⋗¬Fb)∨ (s⋗¬Fc))].
Since f size(0, 0, true, Fr) < f size(0, 0, true, F ), we again replace it with
Fu[s
c ∨ (sc ∨ ((s⋗¬Fb)∨ (s⋗¬Fc)))], and so on and so forth, to eventually
arrive at Fv[(sc ∨ (s⋗ ¬Fb)) ∨ (sc ∨ (s⋗ ¬Fc))], without loss of generality.
Meanwhile, we can reduce F ′ as follows. F ′[¬((s ⋗ Fb) ∧ (s ⋗ Fc))] ❀
F ′x[¬(s⋗Fb)∨¬(s⋗Fc)]❀ F
′
y[(s
c∨(s⋗¬Fb))∨(sc∨(s⋗¬Fc))]. Induction
hypothesis. The other cases are straightforward.
4. The fourth pair: Similar.
5. The fifth pair:
(a) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula which neither is a sub-
formula of the shown sub-formula nor takes as its sub-formula the
shown sub-formula, then we reduce the same sub-formula in F ′. In-
duction hypothesis.
(b) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fa, Fb or Fc, then we reduce the
same sub-formula of all the occurrences of the shown Fa, Fb or Fc in
F ′. Induction hypothesis.
(c) If⋗ reduction 4 takes place on F such that we have; F [(Fa⋗Fb)⋗Fc]❀
Fx[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ ((Fa ⋗ Fb) ∨ (Fa ⋗ Fb ⋗ Fc))], then do nothing on F ′.
And Fx = F ′. Vacuous thereafter.
(d) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula Fp of F in which the shown
sub-formula of F occurs as a strict sub-formula, then similar to the case
1) e).
6. The sixth pair: Straightforward.
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7. The seventh and the eighth pairs: Similar.
8. The ninth pair: Similar except when either ⋗ reduction 4 or 5 takes place,
which we have already covered (for the third pair).
9. The 10th pair: Mostly straightforward. Suppose ⋗ reduction 2 applies such
that we have; F [Fa ∧ Fa ⋗ Fb] ❀ Fp[(Fa ⋗ Fb) ∧ (Fa ⋗ Fb)], then because
we have F ′[Fa ⋗ Fb], we apply induction hypothesis for a conclusion. Or,
suppose that a reduction takes place on a sub-formula of an occurrence of
Fa such that we have; F ❀ Fx[Fu ∧ Fa ⋗ Fb], then by the simultaneous
induction, it does not cost generality if we replace it with Fy[Fu ∧ Fu ⋗ Fb]
that differs from Fx only by the shown sub-formulas. Meanwhile, we apply
the same reduction rule on the occurrence of Fa in F ′ such that we have;
F ′ ❀ F ′y [Fu ⋗ Fb]. Induction hypothesis. Likewise for the others.
10. The 11th pairs: Similar.
11. The 12th and the 13th pairs: Straightforward.
12. The 14th and the 15th pairs: Cf. the approach for the third pair.
By the result of the above bisimulation, we now have F(F ) = F(F ′). However,
it takes only those 5 ⋗ reductions and 4 ¬ reductions to derive a formula in unit
chain expansion; hence we in fact have F(F ) = F(Fx) for some formula Fx in
unit chain expansion. But then by Theorem 1, there could be only one value out
of {0, 1} assigned to [M |= Fx], as required. ⊣
COROLLARY 1 (Normalisation). Given a formula F ∈ F, denote the set of
formulas in unit chain expansion that it can reduce into by F1. Then it holds
for every valuation frame either that [M |= Fa] = 1 for all Fa ∈ F1 or else that
[M |= Fa] = 0 for all Fa ∈ F1.
By Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we may define implication: F1 ⊃ F2 to be an
abbreviation of ¬F1 ∨ F2 - exactly the same - as in classical logic.
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§4. Decidability. We show a decision procedure ∮ for universal validity of
some input formula F . Also assume a terminology of ‘object level’, which is
defined inductively. Given F in unit chain expansion, (A) if s ∈ S in F occurs
as a non-chain or as a head of a unit chain, then it is said to be at the 0-th object
level. (B) if it occurs in a unit chain as s0⋗ · · ·⋗ sk⋗ s or as s0⋗ · · ·⋗ sk⋗ s⋗ ...
for some k ∈ N and some s0, . . . , sk ∈ S, then it is said to be at the (k+1)-th
object level. Further, assume a function toSeq : N→ S∗ satisfying toSeq(0) = ǫ
and toSeq(k + 1) = ⊤. . . . .⊤︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
.
∮
(F : F,object level : N): returning either 0 or 1
\\ This pseudo-textsf uses n, o : N, Fa, Fb : F.
L0: Duplicate F and assign the copy to Fa. If Fa is not already in unit chain
expansion, then reduce it into a formula in unit chain expansion.
L1: Fb := EXTRACT(Fa, object level).
L2: n := COUNT DISTINCT(Fb).
L30: For each I : toSeq(object level) × S distinct for the n elements of S at
the given object level, Do:
L31: If UNSAT(Fb, I), then go to L5.
L32: Else if no unit chains occur in Fa, go to L35.
L33: o :=
∮
(REWRITE(Fa, I, object level), object level + 1).
L34: If o = 0, go to L5.
L35: End of For Loop.
L4: return 1. \\ Yes.
L5: return 0. \\ No.
EXTRACT(F : F,object level : N) returning F ′ : F:
L0: F ′ := F .
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L1: For every s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk for some k ∈ N greater than or equal to
object level and some s0, s1, . . . , sk ∈ S occurring in F ′, replace it with s0 ⋗
· · ·⋗ sobject level.
L2: return F ′.
COUNT DISTINCT(F : F) returning n : N:
L0: return n := (number of distinct members of A in F ).
UNSAT(F : F, I : I) returning true or false:
L0: return true if, for the given interpretation I,
[(I, J) |= F ] = 0. Otherwise, return false.
REWRITE(F : F, I : I,object level : N) returning F ′ : F:
L0: F ′ := F .
L1: remove all the non-unit-chains and unit chains shorter than or equal to
object level from F ′. The removal is in the following sense: if fx∧Fx, Fx∧fx,
fx ∨ Fx or Fx ∨ fx occurs as a sub-formula in F ′ for fx those just specified,
then replace them not simultaneously but one at a time to Fx until no more
reductions are possible.
L20: For each unit chain f in F ′, Do:
L21: if the head of f is 0 under I, then remove the unit chain from F ′; else
replace the head of f with ⊤.
L22: End of For Loop.
L3: return F ′.
The intuition of the procedure is found within the proof below.
PROPOSITION 8 (Decidability of gradual classical logic). Complexity of
∮
(F, 0) is at most EXPTIME.
PROOF. We show that it is a decision procedure. That the complexity bound
cannot be worse than EXPTIME is clear from the semantics (for L0) and from
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the procedure itself. Consider L0 of the main procedure. This reduces a given
formula into a formula in unit chain expansion. In L1 of the main procedure, we
get a snapshot of the input formula. We extract from it components of the 0-th
object level, and check if it is (un)satisfiable. The motivation for this operation is
as follows: if the input formula is contradictory at the 0th-object level, the input
formula is contradictory by the definition of J. Since we are considering validity
of a formula, we need to check all the possible valuation frames. The number
is determined by distinct A elements. L2 gets the number (n). The For loop
starting at L30 iterates through the 2n distinct interpretations. If the snapshot is
unsatisfiable for any such valuation frame, it cannot be valid, which in turn im-
plies that the input formula cannot be valid (L31). If the snapshot is satisfiable
and if the maximum object-level in the input formula is the 0th, i.e. the snapshot
is the input formula, then the input formula is satisfiable for this particular valu-
ation frame, and so we check the remaining valuation frames (L32). Otherwise,
if it is satisfiable and if the maximum object-level in the input formula is not
the 0th, then we need to check that snapshots in all the other object-levels of the
input formula are satisfiable by all the valuation frames. We do this check by
recursion (L33). Notice the first parameter REWRITE(Fa, I, object level) here.
This returns some formula F ′. At the beginning of the sub-procedure, F ′ is a
duplicated copy of Fa (not Fb). Now, under the particular 0-th object level in-
terpretation I, some unit chain in Fa may be already evaluated to 0. Then we do
not need consider them at any deeper object-level. So we remove them from F ′.
Otherwise, in all the remaining unit chains, the 0-th object gets local interpre-
tation of 1. So we replace the S element at the 0-th object level with ⊤ which
always gets 1.19 Finally, all the non-chain S constituents and all the chains
shorter than or equal to object level in Fa are irrelevant at a higher object-level.
19Such replacement does not preserve equivalence; equisatisfiability is preserved, however.
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So we also remove them (from F ′). We pass this F ′ and an incremented ob-
ject level to the main procedure for the recursion.
The recursive process continues either until a sub-formula passed to the main
procedure turns out to be invalid, in which case the recursive call returns 0 (L22
and L4 in the main procedure) to the caller who assigns 0 to o (L24) and again
returns 0, and so on until the first recursive caller. The caller receives 0 once
again to conclude that F is invalid, as expected. Otherwise, we have that F is
valid, for we considered all the valuation frames. The number of recursive calls
cannot be infinite. ⊣
§5. Analysis. In this section I will present an advanced observation about the
principle of gradual logic. I will also highlight an alternative interpretation of
the object-attribute relation, which is hoped to cement the idea of gradual logic.
A moderate comprehension of the gists of Section 1, Section 2 and Section 3
is a pre-requisite for the first sub-section. The sub-section 5.2 assumes a full
understanding of Section 3.
5.1. The notion of recognition cut-off. There are many that can be seen in
the object-attribute relation. According to Postulate 1, all the (attributed) ob-
jects, so long as they remain recognisable as an object, have an extension (recall
the relation between Hat and Hat⋗ ⊤), i.e. they are not atomic; and because an
attribute is also an object, the implication is that no matter how deep the ladder
of attributed objects formed in a sequence of ⋗ goes, there is no possibility that
we arrive at the most precise description of the object. Observed from the other
side, it means that we can always refine any given (attributed) object with more
attributes as we notice ambiguities in them. For illustration, if we have Hat, then
Hat ⋗ Brooch, Hat ⋗ Brooch ⋗ Green, . . . , are, provided that they are not con-
tradictory, guaranteed to be a specific instance of Hat. At the same time, none of
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them is a fully explicated atomic object, since every one of them has extension.
Descriptions in gradual classical logic reflect our intuition about concepts (Cf.
Section 1) in this manner.
One issue that must be touched upon, however, is that the arbitrary ambiguity
has been the reason why natural languages are generally considered unsuited
(Cf. [8, 27]) for a rigorous treatment of concepts. As can be inferred from the
analysis in Section 1 but also found already in Transcendental Logic, the truth in
formal logic can be only this thing or that thing that we define as the truth. But,
then, the arbitrary ambiguity in entities do appear to encumber the construction
of the definition of this and that things, for we seem to be hitting upon an impos-
sibility of knowing what they are. It is then reasonable to presuppose indivisible
entities that act as the building stones of the truth, which is the measure typically
taken in formal/symbolic logic.
A rather different perspective about the ambiguity and atomicity of an entity
was taken in this work, which is embodied in the following reasoning. - If the
arbitrary ambiguity in natural descriptions must be felt universally, it would not
be possible for us to coherently speak on a topic (which naturally concerns con-
cepts referring to objects), for whatever that comes into our mind cannot be fully
disambiguated. As a matter of fact, however, we have little issue in drawing a
comprehensible conclusion, be it agreeable to us or not, from a discussion with
our acquaintances. Concerning it, it appears that what is at stake is not the coax-
ing paradox: although nothing should be comprehensible, we have nonetheless
comprehended the quintessence of something; but, rather, our recognition of
a divisible entity as an indivisible one. As one descriptive - albeit rather im-
promptu - example, suppose we have an apparatus, which has almost no utility,
save that it could tell if a book is in 210 mm × 297 mm. The actual judgement
mechanism of the apparatus is concealed from the eyes of the users. Now, let
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us say that we have applied it to several books, as the result of which some of
them have turned out to be in 210 mm × 297 mm. But then it could happen
that a book is in 209.993 mm × 297.001 mm, another in 210.01 mm × 297.002
mm, if we are to measure the size more accurately by another method. But the
point is that, so long as the measure of judging the size is as facilitated by the
apparatus, we see a given book either in 210 mm × 297 mm, or otherwise. We
will not know of the variance in 210 mm × 297 mm unless the measure itself is
changed. Here, a measure defining a threshold and adopting which we become
indifferent to all the remaining details outside it, is what may be called a recog-
nition cut-off, which in the above example was enforced by the apparatus.
This principle of the recognition cut-off is prominently applied in concept-
manoeuvring in general, where the apparatus is nothing but a state of our mind as
conditioned such as by knowledge and pre-suppositions. We understand things,
and the things are understood. Yet, according to Postulate 1, it looks that they
cannot be understood. Generally, this does not indicate a misuse on our part
of the term: to understand. What it does indicate, on the contrary, is the sus-
ceptibility of the existence of the things to our perception and cognition which
define recognition cut-offs, by the merit of which, if for instance ‘I understand
things’ is given, it finds a cogent interpretation that ‘I’ referring to I under a
recognition cut-off (Cf. Transcendental Logic also for Kant’s observation about
‘I’) understands ‘things’ referring to the things under a recognition cut-off, so
that it becomes indeed possible for one to understand things without him/her, in
supporting the very possibility, being forced to accede that he/she is erring.
With the notion of the recognition cut-off, we can at last give a satisfactory
justice to the subject of the arbitrary ambiguity and atomicity in gradual classical
logic. In the expression Hat⋗ Brooch⋗Green⋗ Lamination, with the intended
reading of the existence of “hat ornamented with a brooch in laminated green”,
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Hat, at least some form of it, must exist before anything, for it would be absurd
to state that it be possible to reason about the attributes in the absence of an
entity to which they are allegedly an attribute. At the moment of the judgement
of the existence, the judgement measure cannot favour one specific hat to other
hats, so long as it is hat, which therefore exerts its influence only over what is
found in the specific domain of discourse in which Hat is found. Even if Hat is
non-atomic, it is still judged as if atomically under the judgement setting forth a
recognition cut-off. It is only when deeper attributes are cogitated that it comes
to light that it was not atomic. Meanwhile the attributes involving Brooch are
again judged as if atomically under the judgement measure reigning over the
domain of discourse conditioned (at least) by the existence of Hat. In this man-
ner, gradual classical logic materialises the observation that we cannot tell apart
whether a so-regarded atomic entity is atomic or is just atomic enough not to be
considered non-atomic.
5.1.1. Homonyms under recognition cut-off. More often than not, literature
stresses that there is something particularly interesting about homonyms since,
unless a sufficient context is given, what they denote cannot be determined. By
virtue of the recognition cut-off, however, they are almost as ambiguous a de-
scription as any other common descriptions, since a description involving con-
cepts referring to objects, according to Postulate 1, possesses the same degree of
ambiguity as a homonym does - the same degree insofar as they are arbitrarily
ambiguous. A ‘book’ identifies that what the concept points to shall be a book,
but nothing more can be asserted. But this then allows us to infer that ‘bow’
with little to no contexts provided still identifies that what the concept refers to
shall be bow. The following criticism is amply expected at this point: such an
answer, for the reason that it by no means addresses the fundamental problem
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that ‘bow’ with no context does not determine which (definition of) ‘bow’ it is,
is absurd. However, if it were absurd, then in order to avoid the same absurdity
it must be explicated what bow, supposing that enough context has been given
to identify it as a violin bow, it is. An answer would burgeon the criticism of
the same kind, and we would never get out of the cycle. If we are permitted
to fluctuate the point of the recognition cut-off freely, it holds that a word with
a context no more determines what it is than that with no context does. One
description concerning concept(s) referring to objects is only comparatively less
ambiguous than others.
5.2. Another interpretations of the object-attribute relation. Semantic in-
terpretation of ⋗ is not restricted to the one that we saw in Section 2, which was
formalised in Section 3. Just like in modal logic, there are other interpretations
that could have a linguistic meaningfulness. In one variant, we may remove the
synchronization condition on I interpretation. The motivation is that, suppose
X ⋗ Y , it may be that we like to say that the attribute Y varies according to
what it is an attribute to: X in this case. Then, if we have Hat ⋗ Green and
Brooch ⋗ Green, we do not know if the same greenness is talked about for Hat
and Brooch. In such an interpretation, we do not have the following distributiv-
ity: Hat∧Brooch⋗Green 7→ (Hat⋗Green)∧(Brooch⋗Green). Another distribu-
tivity of the sort: (Hat∨Brooch)⋗Green 7→ (Hat⋗Green)∨ (Brooch⋗Green)
would also need altered to: (Hat⋗Green)∨ (Brooch⋗Green)∨ (Hat∧Brooch⋗
Green), covering each possibility of the existence of the objects. On the other
hand, we may or may not have the rule of the sort: (Hat ⋗ Green) ⋗ Brooch 7→
(Hat⋗Brooch)∧((Hat⋗Green)∨(Hat⋗Green⋗Brooch)). In our demonstration,
we choose not to include this rule for brevity. We omit ⊤ and ⊥, for ⊤ does not
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behave well in (⊤ ⋗ F1) ∧ (⊤ ⋗ F1) under the specified interpretation.20 Let us
formalise this logic, beginning with peripheral definitions.
DEFINITION 12 (Unit graph chain/unit graph expansion). Given any F (no
occurrences of ⊤ and ⊥), we say that F is a unit graph chain if and only if
it is recognised in the following rules.
• A unit chain is a unit graph chain.
• If F1 is a unit graph chain and a is a literal, then F1 ⋗ a is a unit graph
chain.
• If a is a literal, and F1 and F2 are either a literal or a unit graph chain,
then F1 ∧ F2 ⋗ a is a unit graph chain.
We say that a given formula is in unit graph expansion if and only if all the
chains that occur in the formula are a unit graph chain.
By G with or without a sub-/super-script we denote a formula that is either a
literal or a unit graph chain.
The semantics is as follows. Assume that I(k) for k ∈ N is the power set of
{0, 1, . . . , k} minus the empty set.
• ∀a ∈ A.¬a 7→ ac (¬ reduction 1).
• ¬(F1 ∧ F2) 7→ ¬F1 ∨ ¬F2 (¬ reduction 2).
• ¬(F1 ∨ F2) 7→ ¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 (¬ reduction 3).
• ¬(G0∧· · ·∧Gk⋗F2) 7→ ¬G0∨· · ·∨¬Gk∨(G0∧· · ·∧Gk⋗¬F2) (¬ reduction
4).
• G0 ∨G1 ∨ · · · ∨Gk+1 ⋗ F 7→
∨
I∈I(k+1)(
∧
j∈I Gj ⋗ F ) (⋗ reduction 3).21
• F1 ⋗ F2 ∧ F3 7→ (F1 ⋗ F2) ∧ (F1 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 4).
• F1 ⋗ F2 ∨ F3 7→ (F1 ⋗ F2) ∨ (F1 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 5).
20It is also recommendable that the number of elements of each domain of discourse be at least
countably infinite in this interpretation.
21This should not be confused with
∨
I∈I(k+1)(
∧
j∈I(Gj ⋗ F )).
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• F1 ∧ (F2 ∨ F3)⋗ F4 7→ (F1 ∧ F2) ∨ (F1 ∧ F3)⋗ F4 (obj distribution 1).
• (F1 ∨ F2) ∧ F3 ⋗ F4 7→ (F1 ∧ F3) ∨ (F2 ∧ F3)⋗ F4 (obj distribution 2).
We assume that the ⋗ reduction 3 applies to any ∨-connected unit graph chains
with no regard to a particular association among the unit graph chains: it applies
just as likely to (G0 ∨ G1) ∨ (G2 ∨ G3) ⋗ F as to G0 ∨ (G2 ∨ (G3 ∨ G1)) ⋗ F .
Similarly for the ∧-connected formulas in ¬ reduction 4.
PROPOSITION 9 (Reduction of induction measure). Let induction measure be
the formula size (the main induction), the inverse of (the number of ¬+1) (a sub-
induction), the inverse of (the number of ⋗ + 1) (a sub-sub-induction), and the
inverse of (the number of ∧ + 1) (a sub-sub-sub-induction). Then the induction
measure strictly decreases at each reduction on a given formula. Additionally,
associativity and commutativity of ∧ and ∨ do not alter the induction measure.
PROOF. Checked with a Java program, whose source code is as found in Ap-
pendix A. The test cases are found in Appendix B. ⊣
DEFINITION 13 (Domains and valuations). Let T denote a non-empty set that
has all the elements that match the following inductive rules.
• 〈a〉 for a ∈ A is an element of T .
• ⌊a⌋ for a ∈ A is an element of T .
• if t is an element of T , then so are both 〈t〉 and ⌊t⌋.
• if t1, t2 are elements of T , then so are 〈t1, t2〉 and ⌊t1⌋.⌊t2⌋.
We assume that 〈 〉 defines an unordered set: 〈t1, t2〉 = 〈t2, t1〉; 〈t, t〉 = 〈t〉. We
also assume the following congruence relations among the elements: 〈〈t〉〉 .= 〈t〉,
〈t1, t2〉
.
= 〈t2, t1〉 and ⌊⌊t⌋⌋ .= ⌊t⌋. Then by T˙ we denote a sub-set of T which
contains only the least elements in each congruence class.22 Now, let T ∗ denote
22Here, an element in one congruence class is smaller than another if it contains a fewer number
of symbols.
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the set of all the finite sequences of elements of T˙ , e.g. t0.t1. . . . .tk for some
k ∈ N, plus an empty sequence which we denote by {ǫ}. An element of T ∗
is referred to by t∗ with or without a sub-script. Then, we define a domain
function D : T ∗ → 2A\∅, and a valuation frame as a 2-tuple: (I, J), where
I : T ∗ ×A → {0, 1} is what we call local interpretation and J : T ∗\{ǫ} → {0, 1}
is what we call global interpretation. The following are defined to satisfy for all
k ∈ N, for all t∗ ∈ T ∗, and for all t0, . . . , tk ∈ T˙ .
Regarding domains of discourse:
• For all t∗ ∈ T ∗, D(t∗) is closed under complementation and is non-empty.
Regarding local interpretations:
• ∀a ∈ D(t∗).[I(t∗, a) = 0] ∨† [I(t∗, a) = 1].
• ∀a ∈ D(t∗).[I(t∗, a) = 0]↔† [I(t∗, ac) = 1].
Regarding global interpretations:
• J(⌊t0⌋.⌊t1⌋. . . . .⌊tk⌋) =
∧k
i=0 J(⌊t0⌋. . . . .⌊ti−1⌋.ti).
• J(t∗.〈t0, t1, . . . , tk〉) =
∧k
i=0 J(t
∗.ti).
• ∀a ∈ D(t∗).J(t∗.a) = I(t∗, a).
To briefly explain the T ∗, it provides a semantic mapping for every formula
in unit graph expansion. Compared to the corresponding definition of domain
functions and valuation frames back in Section 3, here the domain function can-
not be determined by a sequence of literals. What was then a literal must be
generalised to possibly conjunctively connected unit graph chains and literals.
Note the implicit presumption of the associativity and commutativity of the clas-
sical ∧ in the definition of T˙ .
DEFINITION 14 (Valuation). Suppose a valuation frame M = (I, J). The fol-
lowing are defined to hold.
• [M |= G] = J(compress ◦map(G)).
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• [M |= F1 ∧ F2] = [M |= F1] ∧† [M |= F2].
• [M |= F1 ∨ F2] = [M |= F1] ∨† [M |= F2].
where map is defined by:
• map(G0 ∧G1) = 〈map(G0),map(G1)〉.
• map(G0 ⋗G1) = ⌊map(G0)⌋.⌊map(G1)⌋.
• map(a) = ⌊a⌋.
and compress, given an input, returns the least element in the same congruence
class as the input.
DEFINITION 15 (Validity and satisfiability). A formula F with no occurrences
of ⊤ and ⊥ is said to be satisfiable in a valuation frame M iff [M |= F ] = 1; it
is said to be valid iff it is satisfiable in all the valuation frames; it is said to be
invalid iff it is not valid; and it is said to be unsatisfiable iff it is not satisfiable.
I state the main results. Many details will be omitted, the proof approaches being
similar to those that we saw in Section 3.
DEFINITION 16 (Procedure recursiveReduce2). The procedure given below
takes as an input a formula F in unit graph expansion.
Description of recursiveReduce2(F )
1. Replace ∧ and ∨ in F which is not in a chain with ∨ and respectively with ∧.
These two operations are simultaneous.
2. Replace all the non-chains a ∈ A in F simultaneously with ac.
3. For every chain Fa in F which is not a strict a strict sub-chain of another
chain, with its head Fh and its tail Ft, replace Fa with
recursiveReduce2(Fh) ∨ (Fh ⋗ recursiveReduce2(Ft)).
4. Reduce F via ⋗ reductions 4 and 5 in unit graph expansion.
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PROPOSITION 10 (Reduction of negated unit graph expansion). Let F be a for-
mula in unit graph expansion. Then ¬F reduces via the ¬ and ⋗ reductions into
recursiveReduce2(F ) which is in unit graph expansion. The reduction is unique.
LEMMA 7 (Elementary complementation). For any G0⋗G1⋗· · ·⋗Gk for k ∈
N and Gk ∈ A,23 if for a given valuation frame it holds that [M |= G0⋗G1⋗· · ·⋗
Gk] = 1, then it also holds that [M |= recursiveReduce2(G0⋗G1⋗· · ·⋗Gk)] = 0;
or if it holds that [M |= recursiveReduce2(G0⋗G1⋗ · · ·⋗Gk)] = 1, then it holds
that [M |= G0 ⋗G1 ⋗ · · ·⋗Gk] = 0. These two events are mutually exclusive.
PROOF. Let us abbreviate recursiveReduce2 by R. What we need to show
for the first obligation is [M |= R(G0)] = [M |= G0 ⋗ R(G1)] = · · · = [M |=
G0 ⋗ · · ·⋗R(Gk)] = 0. The reasoning process is recursive on each Gi, 0 ≤ i ≤ k
within R. Since the formula size stays finite and since each reduction incurs
finite branching, there is an end to each recursion. In the end, we will be showing
that [M |= G′0 ⋗ . . . G′j−1 ⋗ R(G′j)] = 0 for j ∈ N and G′j ∈ A, whenever the
pattern is encountered during the recursion. For each such pattern, we will have
that [M |= G′0 ⋗ . . . G′j−1 ⋗G′j ] = 1 (the co-induction is left to readers; note the
property of a formula in unit graph expansion). Then the result follows. ⊣
LEMMA 8 (Elementary double negation). Let G denote G0 ⋗ G1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ Gk
for k ∈ N and Gk ∈ A. Then for any valuation frame it holds that [M |= G] =
[M |= recursiveReduce2(recursiveReduce2(G))].
PROOF. Let us use an abbreviation R for recursiveReduce2 for space.
R(R(G)) = R(R(G0) ∨ (G0 ⋗R(G1)) ∨ · · · ∨ (G0 ⋗G1 ⋗ · · ·⋗Gk−1 ⋗R(Gk))) =
R(R(G0)) ∧ R(G0 ⋗ R(G1)) ∧ · · · ∧ R(G0 ⋗ G1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ Gk−1 ⋗ R(Gk)). Since
translation to disjunctive normal form is tedius, let us solve the problem directly
23 Gk is always an element of A by the definition of a unit graph chain.
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here. The strategy is that we first show [M |= R(R(G0))] = [M |= G0], which
reduces (via Lemma 7) the right hand side of the equation into [M |= G0∧ (G0⋗
R(R(G1)))∧ (G0⋗R(G1⋗R(G2)))∧· · ·∧ (G0⋗R(G1⋗ · · ·⋗Gk−1⋗R(Gk)))] =
[M |= (G0 ⋗ R(R(G1))) ∧ (G0 ⋗ R(G1 ⋗ R(G2))) ∧ · · · ∧ (G0 ⋗ R(G1 ⋗ · · · ⋗
Gk−1 ⋗ R(Gk)))]; we then show [M |= G0 ⋗ R(R(G1))] = [M |= G0 ⋗ G1] to
reduce again; and so on and so forth. In the end, we arrive at the required result.
Therefore it suffices to show that [M |= G0 ⋗ · · · ⋗ Gi−1 ⋗ R(R(Gi))] = [M |=
G0 ⋗ · · ·⋗Gi−1 ⋗Gi], 0 ≤ i ≤ k. But each Gi in R(R(Gi)) is strictly smaller in
the number of symbols appearing within than G. So the reasoning is recursive.
Because every formula is of a finite size and the reduction rules induce only
finite branchings, it follows that every recursion is also finite, reaching at the
obligation pattern of [M |= G′0 ⋗ · · · ⋗ R(R(G′j))] = [M |= G′0 ⋗ · · · ⋗ G′j ] for
G′j ∈ A. But these equations hold by the way the local/global interpretations are
defined. ⊣
THEOREM 3. Denote by X the set of the expressions comprising all [M |=
G] for a formula G in unit graph expansion. Then for every valuation frame,
(X, recursiveReduce2, ⊤˙, ⊥˙,∧†,∨†) with suppositional nullary connectives: ⊤˙
and ⊥˙ defines a Boolean algebra.
PROOF. It suffices to show anihilation, identity, associativity, commutativity,
distributivity, idempotence, absorption, complementation and double negation.
Straightforward with Lemma 7, Lemma 8, and by following the approaches
taken in Section 3. ⊣
The insertion of the suppositional connectives into the theorem is inessential,
since we could take it for granted that we are considering F minus ⊤ and ⊥
plus ⊤˙ and ⊥˙, except that we never make use of ⊤˙ or ⊥˙ in an expression. For
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the following results, let us enforce that G(F ) denote the set of formulas in unit
graph expansion that F without the occurrences of ⊤ and ⊥ reduce into.
THEOREM 4 (Bisimulation). Assumed below are pairs of formulas in which
⊤ and ⊥ do not occur. F ′ differs from F only by the shown sub-formulas, i.e.
F ′ derives from F by replacing the shown sub-formula for F ′ with the shown
sub-formula for F and vice versa. Then for each pair (F, F ′) below, it holds for
every valuation frame that [M |= F1] = [M |= F2] for all F1 ∈ G(F ) and for all
F2 ∈ G(F ′).
F [G0 ∨ · · · ∨Gk+1 ⋗ Fc] , F
′[
∨
I∈I(k+1)
(
∧
j∈I
Gj ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ⋗ Fb ∧ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fb) ∧ (Fa ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ⋗ Fb ∨ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fb) ∨ (Fa ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ∧ (Fb ∨ Fc)⋗ Fd] , F
′[(Fa ∧ Fb) ∨ (Fa ∧ Fc)⋗ Fd]
F [(Fa ∨ Fb) ∧ Fc ⋗ Fd] , F
′[(Fa ∧ Fc) ∨ (Fb ∧ Fc)⋗ Fd]
F [¬G] , F ′[recursiveReduce2(G)]
F [¬(Fa ∧ Fb)] , F
′[¬Fa ∨ ¬Fb]
F [¬(Fa ∨ Fb)] , F
′[¬Fa ∧ ¬Fb]
F [¬(G0 ∧ . . .Gk ⋗ Fa)] , F
′[¬G0 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Gk ∨ (G0 ∧ · · · ∧Gk ⋗ ¬Fa)]
F [Fa ∨ Fa] , F
′[Fa]
F [Fa ∧ Fa] , F
′[Fa]
F [Fa ∨ Fb] , F
′[Fb ∨ Fa]
F [Fa ∨ (Fb ∨ Fc)] , F
′[(Fa ∨ Fb) ∨ Fc]
F [Fa ∧ Fb] , F
′[Fb ∧ Fa]
F [Fa ∧ (Fb ∧ Fc)] , F
′[(Fa ∧ Fb) ∧ Fc]
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PROOF. Similar in approach to the proof of Theorem 2, the proof following
by simultaneous composite induction by the induction measure as in Propo-
sition 9, which strictly decreases at each reduction. We first establish that
G(F1) = G(F2). One way, to show that to each reduction on F ′ corresponds
reduction(s) on F , is straightforward, for we can choose to reduce F into F ′
in most of the cases, thereafter synchronizing both of the reductions. We show
one sub-proof for the 10th pair, however, to be very safe. If ⋗ reduction 3 ap-
plies (Fa = G for some unit graph chain G), then we have; F [G0 ∨ G1 ∨ · · · ∨
(G ∨ G) ∨ · · · ∨ Gk+1 ⋗ Fa] 7→ Fp[
∧
I∈I(k+1)(
∨
j∈I Gj ⋗ Fa)]. Since associa-
tion by ∨ on the constituting unit graph chains is freely chosen, let us assume
that
∧
I∈I(k+1)(
∨
j∈I Gj ⋗ Fa) is ordered such that, from the left to the right, the
number of the occurrences of G either stays the same, or else strictly increases.
Then, generally speaking, there are three groups of sub-formulas: those that do
not have the occurrences of the G; those in which the G occurs once; and those in
which there are two occurrecnes of G. Now, for F ′, applying the same reduction
rule, we gain: F ′[G0∨G1∨· · ·∨G∨· · ·∨Gk⋗Fa] 7→ F ′p[
∧
I∈I(k)(
∨
j∈I Gj⋗Fa)].
It is straightforward to see that F ′p involves every constituent from the first group
of Fp (if the group has any constituent at all); and half of the constituents from
the second group. So we can sequentially apply induction hypothesis on Fp to
match up with F ′p. Induction hypothesis.
Into the other way to show that to each reduction on F corresponds reduc-
tion(s) on F ′:
1. The first pair:
(a) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula which neither is a sub-
formula of the shown sub-formula nor takes as its sub-formula the
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shown sub-formula, then we reduce the same sub-formula in F ′. In-
duction hypothesis (note that the number of reduction steps is that of
F into this direction).
(b) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fc then we reduce the same sub-
formula of both occurrences of Fc in F ′. Induction hypothesis.
(c) If⋗ reduction 3 takes place on F such that we have; F [G0∨· · ·∨Gk+1⋗
Fc]❀ Fx[
∨
I∈I(k+1)(
∧
j∈I Gj⋗Fc)], F and Fx differ only by the shown
sub-formulas. Do nothing on F ′, and Fx = F ′. Vacuous thereafter.
(d) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula Fp of F in which the
shown sub-formula of F occurs as a strict sub-formula (F [G0 ∨ · · · ∨
Gk+1 ⋗ Fc] = F [Fp[G0 ∨ · · · ∨ Gk+1 ⋗ Fc]]), then we have F [Fp[G0 ∨
· · · ∨ Gk+1 ⋗ Fc]] ❀ Fx[Fq[G0 ∨ · · · ∨ Gk+1 ⋗ Fc]]. But we have
F ′ = F ′[F ′p[
∨
I∈I(k)(
∧
j∈I Gj ⋗ Fc)]]. Therefore we apply the same
reduction on F ′p to gain;
F ′[F ′p[
∨
I∈I(k)(
∧
j∈I Gj ⋗ Fc)]] ❀ F
′
x[F
′
p′ [
∨
I∈I(k)(
∧
j∈I Gj ⋗ Fc)]]. In-
duction hypothesis.
2. The second and the third: Straightforward.
3. The fourth pair:
(a) If obj distribution 1 takes place on F such that we have; F [Fa ∧ (Fb ∨
Fc)⋗Fd]❀ Fx[(Fa ∧Fb)∨ (Fa ∧Fc)⋗Fd], then do nothing on F ′; and
we have Fx = F ′. Vacuous thereafter.
(b) If obj distribution 2 takes place on F such that we have; F [(Fβ ∨Fγ)∧
(Fb ∨ Fc) ⋗ Fd] ❀ Fx[(Fβ ∧ (Fb ∨ Fc)) ∨ (Fγ ∧ (Fb ∨ Fc)) ⋗ Fd] for
Fa = Fβ ∨Fγ , then by induction hypothesis, it does not cost generality
if we replace it with Fp[((Fβ∧Fb)∨(Fβ∧Fc))∨((Fγ∧Fb)∨(Fγ∧Fc))⋗Fd]
that differs from Fx only by the shown sub-formulas. Meanwhile, we
derive; F ′[((Fβ ∨Fγ) ∧ Fb) ∨ ((Fβ ∨Fγ) ∧ Fc)⋗ Fd]❀ F ′x[((Fβ ∧ Fb)∨
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(Fγ ∧ Fb)) ∨ ((Fβ ∧ Fc)∨ (Fγ ∧Fc))⋗ Fd]. Apply induction hypothesis
on Fx to arrive at F ′x. Vacuous thereafter.
(c) The other cases: Straightforward.
4. The fifth pair: Similar.
5. The sixth pair: Straightforward, since a unit graph chain cannot be further
reduced, since the reduction of ¬G is unique, and since, by the defini-
tion of ⋗ reduction 3, it cannot apply unless ¬G has been fully reduced to
recursiveReduce2(G).
6. The rest: Cf. the proof of Theorem 2.
By the result of the above bisimulation, we now have G(F ) = G(F ′). However,
it takes only those 4 ¬ reductions, 3 ⋗ reductions, obj distribution 1 and obj
distribution 2 to derive a formula in unit graph expansion; hence we in fact
have G(F ) = G(Fx) for some formula Fx in unit graph expansion. But then by
Theorem 3, there could be only one value out of {0, 1} assigned to [M |= Fx], as
required. ⊣
COROLLARY 2 (Normalisation). Given a formula F with no occurrences of
⊤ and ⊥, denote the set of formulas in unit graph expansion that it can reduce
into by G1. Then it holds for every valuation frame either that [M |= Fa] = 1 for
all Fa ∈ G1 or else that [M |= Fa] = 0 for all Fa ∈ G1.
By construction, this logic is also decidable, but for any unrestrained expressions
the complexity will be high, owing to ⋗ reduction 3.
§6. Conclusion. This work analysed phenomena that arise around concepts
and their attrbutes, and called attention the positioning of atomic entities in for-
mal logic, based on the notion of recognition cut-off. Both the philosophical and
the mathematical foundations of gradual logic were laid down. For the object-
attribute relation, there may be many linguistically reasonable interpretations.
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To conclude, I state connections of gradual logic to Aristotle’s logic and oth-
ers, along with prospects.
6.1. Connection to Aristotle’s logic. Natural expressions require more than
one types of negation. Given an expression X, if it is contradictorily negated
into another expression Y, X is true iff Y is false. A contrary expression to X,
however, only demands that it be false if X is true. A sub-contrary expression
to X, on the other hand, demands that it be true if X is false. The distinction,
which is as good as defunct in the post-Fregean modern logic, despite sporadic
recurrences of the theme here and then [25, 28, 20], has been nonetheless known
- already since the era of Aristotle’s. An extensive discussion on contrarieties is
found in Categories for qualities and in Prior Analytics for categorical sentences.
Meanwhile, only external, contradictory negations remain proper in the modern
logic, contrarieties dismissed. Some such as Lukasiewicz [19] contend that the
modern logic on sentences, founded by the Stoics and axiomatized by Frege,
is logically prior to Aristotelian term logic in that, according to his judgement,
logic on propositions underlies the term logic. Others are not so convinced.
Some such as Horn, Sommers and Englebretsen defend the term logic in the
respective works of theirs [16, 26, 7], countenancing that there are features that
have been lost in the mass-scale migration from the term logic to the modern
logic. With analysis in Section 1, I have in part concurred with proponents of the
term logic. One that is of particular interest in the Aristotelian term logic is the
use of indefinite24 nouns as result from prefixing ‘not’ to a noun, e.g. from man
to not-man; and of indefinite verbs, from walks to not-walks. For sentences,
they can be either affirmative or negative. “Man walks”, “Not-Man walks”,
“Man Not-walks”, and “Not-Man Not-walks” are affirmative; “Man does not
24These terminologies are taken from The Internet Classics Archive (classics.mit.edu/Aristotle).
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Not-walk”, “Not-Man does not walk”, “Man does not Not-walk”, and “Not-
Man does not Not-walk” are negative corresponding to them.25 Hence to each
singular sentence26 , say “Man walks”, there are seven corresponding sentences
that are either negative or having an indefinite term. There is no such denying
particle on terms in Fregean modern logic; and diversification of negation by
scopal distinction [25] or by adopting more than one external negation opera-
tors [28] on sentences cannot make amends for the limitation that arises directly
from sentential atomicity. One crucial point about a proposition in the mod-
ern logic in fact is that, even if it is an atomic proposition, one never knows
how complex it already is, and consequently how many contraries it ought to
have (Cf. also Geach [10]). However, concerning this matter, the assumption
of atomicity of entities in formal/symbolic logic may be more fundamental. Al-
though to Aristotle, too, there existed indivisible entities, it is unlikely that such
entities, if they are to exist, are cognizable, so long as the entities that we deal
with are concepts that refer to objects; and, about those, we cannot reason. One
may also apply Postulate 1 to propositions in general, whereby a proposition
becomes an object, which will then be divisible. Then there will be propositions
about the proposition as its attributes. By explaining the indivisible in terms of
recognition cut-offs, one can also appreciate that any proposition, if treated as
an object, will have attributive propositions about it, and they, too, as internal
25 Judging from Aristotle’s texts (in translation), affirmative sentences in the form: X is Y, are
primary to Aristotle. X and Y can be in the form Not-X’ or Not-Y’, for they are in any case
affirmed in the sentence. However, it is not the case for Aristotle that sentences of the form:
X is not Y, denying Y of X, bears a truth value primarily. This is clear from an example (Cf.
On Interpretation) about the truth value of ‘Socrates is ill/Socrates is not ill’. In case Socrates
does not denote anything, then the non-being (and non-being is not a being) cannot be ill in an
ordinary sense, and so ‘Socrates is ill’ is false. Aristotle then judges that ‘Socrates is not ill’ is
true. But this would remain debatable if it were the case that negative statements primarily bore
a truth value. For, then, it, by exactly the same reasoning, could be simply false in the absence
of Socrates. Therefore, while in the Fregean logic whatever sentences may be a proposition, with
no regard whether it is affirmative or negative, the differentiation is important in Aristotelian term
logic.
26A sentence that does not specify “all” or “some” are singular.
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structures of the proposition, can be structured in ⋗s. Then not just one, not just
two, but arbitrarily many internal contradictions can be brought to light, which
are externally contraries, for those propositions that have been hitherto atomic.
There is another relevant remark of Aristotle’s found in Prior/Posterior Ana-
lytics. It is combinability of predicates. If bird is for example both beautiful and
singing, then that could be expressed in the first-order logic as; IsBeautiful(bird)∧
IsSinging(bird), where bird is a term. But in so expressing, it goes no further.
When we attempt a proximity mapping of ‘Bird is beautiful, and it is singing’ in
gradual logic with ‘Bird is (judged under a domain of discourse); and it has the
attribute of being beautiful, and that it has the capacity of singing (judged under
another domain of discourse),’ we gain; (Bird⋗Beautiful)∧ (Bird⋗Singing); or,
equivalently Bird⋗Beautiful∧Singing, the two attributes conjoining into a unified
attribute. Similar may also hold for the other side of ⋗. Exactly how combina-
tion occurs depends on a given linguistic interpretation on the object-attribute
relation. Aristotle mentions of such combination in one part. Now, why a sim-
ilar process does not occur in the above-given first-order expression is because,
not only of the terms but also of all the predicates, form is pre-defined. Fregean
terms are indivisible and fixed; and it must be known how many Fregean terms
each Fregean predicate will take.
To conclude this sub-section, we saw that first-order logic does not share the
same logical foundation of the term logic. Aristotle’s logic treats terms both
as subjects and predicates, whereas Fregean terms are not Fregean predicates,
nor vice versa. The object-attribute relation in gradual logic is closer in the
respect to Aristotle’s subject-predicate relation than the relation that holds be-
tween Fregean terms and Fregean predicates. As stated in 5.1, however, in grad-
ual logic X ⋗ Y may itself act as an object, as in (X ⋗ Y ) ⋗ Z, distinct from
Aristotelian subject-predicate relation which does not produce a subject.
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As one research interest out of gradual logic, it should be fruitful to conduct
cross-studies against Aristotle’s logic, and to see how well Aristotle’s syllogism
can be explained within. Instead of embedding Aristotle’s logic in first-order
logic [1] or first-order logic in Aristotle’s logic [26], the strengths that the two
have may be mutually extended. gradual logic may pave a way for realising the
possibility. It must be pointed out, however, that, in order to attempt modelling
the universal/particular sentences, the three figures and syllogism in Prior An-
alytics, it is necessary that we develop gradual predicate logic, as to be stated
shortly.
6.2. Gradual X Logic. Meta-framework of some existing framework(s) of-
fers a way of deriving new results without destroying the properties of the orig-
inal framework(s). As it retains principles in the original framework, it is also
highly reusable. For example, assuming that all the (Fregean) terms and quantifi-
cations are contained within a domain of discourse, replacement of the underly-
ing propositional logic in this work with first-order logic, or, in general, another
Boolean logic X, gives us gradual X logic, and all the main results that we saw
go through, apart from the decidability result which depends on the decidability
of the underlying logic. The reason that we can simply swap the underlying in
this manner is because the meta-framework considered in this work acts only on
the 0/1 (Cf. the given semantics). How the 0/1 is generated is irrelevant to the
applicability of the meta-constructs that ⋗s generate.
However, from a theoretical perspective about the use of predicates within
gradual logic, the use of intra-domain-of-discourse predicates/quantifications is
conservative, since the terms so introduced will be atomic, which is not in har-
mony with the philosophical standpoint that was taken in this work. Real theo-
retical extensions will be by introducing predicates that range over attributed ob-
jects themselves. For instance, suppose that we have two expressions Adjective⋗
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Sheep and Ovine, then we may say IsEqualTo(Adjective ⋗ Sheep,Ovine) in
some (but not necessarily all) domains of discourse. This type of extension
may be called active predicate extension. In this direction, there are both philo-
sophical/linguistic and mathematical challenges, and it will be important to ad-
equately capture interactions between the active predicates and the reduction
rules.
6.3. On tacit agreement. The incremental shift in domain of discourse mod-
els tacit agreement, which is otherwise understood as a context. Within for-
mal logic considered in artificial intelligence, a line of studies since McCarthy
[21, 4, 11, 24] have set a touchstone for logics handling contextual reasonings.
In those context logics,27 all the propositions are judged under a context depend-
ing on which their truth values are determined. The question of what a context
is, nonetheless, has not been pursued in the context logics any farther than that
it is a rich object that is only partially explained. But because they treat a propo-
sition as, in comparison, something that is known, there emerges a distinction
between a context and a proposition whereby the former becomes a meta-term
like a nominal in hybrid logic [3] that conditions the latter. As much as the
consideration appears natural, it may be also useful to think what truly makes a
context differ from a proposition, for, suppose a proposition that Holmes LS is
a detective in the context of Sherlock Holmes stories [21], it appears on a rea-
sonable ground that that the scenes (under which the proposition falls) are the
stories of Sherlock Holmes is indeed a proposition. And if a proposition itself
is a rich object that can be only partially explained, then the fundamental gap
between the two domains closes in.
27There are other logics termed context logics which treat a context as an implication. But these,
by explicitly stating what follow from what in the same domain of discourse, do not truly express
the tacitness of a tacit agreement.
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Appendix A - a Java file, and test cases for Proposition 7. The Java code
(version 1.6) that is used for the tests of Proposition 7 and Proposition 9 is
listed below.
import java . u t i l . Stack ;
/ * *
* Written j u s t f o r proving two r e s u l t s on ” Logic on
* Recogni t ion Cut−Off : Objects , A t t r i b u t e s and Atomic i ty ” .
* This program does not perform any va lue comparisons , which must be manually done .
* Intended f o r a pers ona l use , t h e r e are hardly any e x c e p t i o n handl ing . In any case ,
* the s ource i s in p u b l i c to s e e where e r r o r s are thrown .
* An argument should be provided . I f i t i s 1 , then the program checks the r e s u l t s
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* f o r P r o p o s i t i o n 7( P re l iminary o b s e r v a t i o n ) ; o therwis e , i t checks the r e s u l t s
* f o r P r o p o s i t i o n 9 .
* The outputs look l i k e t h i s : <p>
* ”======TEST n , X ======== f i r s t e x p r e s s i o n === second e x p r e s s i o n ”
* on the f i r s t l i n e where the ’n ’ i n d i c a t e s which t e s t procedure t h a t i s being
* c a l l e d ; X i s e i t h e r true or f a l s e corres ponding to the Boolean parameter of
* f s i z e f u n c t i o n on the paper ; the ’ f i r s t expres s ion ’ and the ’ second
* expres s ion ’ a formula whose va lue i s being c a l c u l a t e d . <p>
* On the second l i n e appears the c a l c u l a t e d r e s u l t o f the ’ f i r s t expres s ion ’.<p>
* And on the t h i r d l i n e t h a t o f the ’ second expres s ion ’.<p>
* On the four th l i n e are found f o r the ’ f i r s t expres s ion ’ the i n v e r s e of
* ( ( the number of occurrences o f ! ) + 1 ) , t h a t o f % (+ 1 on the denumerator ) ,
* and , in cas e of the second t e s t , a l s o t h a t o f * (+ 1 on the denumerator ) . <p>
* ON the f i f t h l i n e , same but f o r the ’ second expres s ion ’ . <p>
* This b a s i c s t r u c t u r e r e p e a t s as many as the number of the t e s t c a s e s . <p>
* B r i e f l y remarking on the syntax , an e x p r e s s i o n i s w r i t t e n in p r e f i x form .
* A s mal l a lphabe t which must be of l e n g t h 1 denote s a l i t e r a l . A c a p i t a l
* a lphabe t o f the l e n g t h 1 denote s a g e n e r a l formula , on the other hand .
* Grammar ( l e t us denote an e x p r e s s i o n by EXP ) : <p>
* 1 . A formula i s EXP.<p>
* 2 . !EXP i s EXP. ! means not . <p>
* 3 . * (EXP ) ( EXP) i s EXP. * means and . <p>
* 4 . +(EXP ) ( EXP) i s EXP. + means or . <p>
* 5 . %(EXP ) ( EXP) i s EXP. % means the objec t−a t t r i b u t e r e l a t i o n . <p>
* Also remarking on the r e s u l t s , ˆ n i s exponent to immediate ly preceding number .
* n /m denote s n div ided by m. + denote s a d d i t i o n .
* ( l =n ) a f t e r a c a p i t a l a lphabe t i n d i c a t e s the va lue to the second argument of
* the f u n c t i o n f s i z e .
* @author
*
* /
p u b l i c c l a s s C a l c u l a t o r {
//========DATA========
p r i v a t e s t a t i c enum FType{
LITERAL, / / a l i t e r a l .
NONLITERAL, / / not a l i t e r a l .
GFORMULA / / Sub−formula s t i l l to be proces s ed .
}
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p r i v a t e s t a t i c S t r i n g f l e f t ;
p r i v a t e s t a t i c S t r i n g f r i g h t ;
p r i v a t e s t a t i c Stack<I nteger> s t a c k ;
/ / t h e s e t h r e e are used to g e t the number of occurrences o f !,% and * .
p r i v a t e s t a t i c i n t neg counter ;
p r i v a t e s t a t i c i n t obat counter ;
p r i v a t e s t a t i c i n t and counter ;
//====================
/ * *
* I f args = ”1” , t h i s procedure checks the r e s u l t s f o r P r o p o s i t i o n 7 . At the
* same time , i t t e l l s the i n v e r s e of the number of occurrences o f n e g a t i o n s
* ( ! ) and the i n v e r s e of the number of occurrences o f .> (%).
* Otherwise , i t checks the r e s u l t s f o r P r o p o s i t i o n 9 . At the same time , i t
* t e l l s the i n v e r s e of the number of the occurrences o f n e g a t i o n s ( ! ) , the
* i n v e r s e of the number of the occurrences o f .> (%) ,
* and the i n v e r s e of the number of the occurrences o f c o n j u n c t i o n s ( * ) .
* @param args
* /
p u b l i c s t a t i c vo id main ( S t r i n g [ ] args ){
i f ( args [ 0 ] . equa l s ( ” 1 ” ) )
{
t e s t 1 ( ) ; t e s t 2 ( ) ; t e s t 3 ( ) ; t e s t 4 ( ) ; t e s t 5 ( ) ; t e s t 6 ( ) ; t e s t 7 ( ) ;
t e s t 8 ( ) ; t e s t 9 ( ) ; t e s t 1 0 ( ) ; t e s t 1 1 ( ) ; t e s t 1 2 ( ) ; t e s t 1 3 ( ) ;
}
e l s e
{
t e s t 1 B ( ) ;
t e s t 2 B ( ) ; t e s t 3 B ( ) ; t e s t 4 B ( ) ; t e s t 5 B ( ) ; t e s t 6 B ( ) ; t e s t 7 B ( ) ; t e s t 8 B ( ) ;
t e s t 9 B ( ) ; t e s t 1 0 B ( ) ; t e s t 1 1 B ( ) ; t e s t 1 2 B ( ) ; t e s t 1 3 B ( ) ;
}
}
/ * *
* Tes t neg reduc t ion 1 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g ( ” ! s ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (” s ” ) ;
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printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 1 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t neg reduc t ion 2 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 2 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g ( ” ! * (A) ( B ) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” + ( !A ) ( ! B ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 2 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t neg reduc t ion 3 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 3 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g ( ” ! + (A) ( B ) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” * ( !A ) ( ! B ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 3 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t neg reduc t ion 4 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 4 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”!%( s ) (A) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” + ( s )(%( s ) ( ! A ) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 4 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t neg reduc t ion 5 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 5 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(%(A) ( B ) ) ( C) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”*(%(A) (C)) (+(%(A) ( B))(%(A)(%(B ) (C ) ) ) ) ” ) ;
/ / ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 5 ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 5 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t .> reduc t ion 1 .
* /
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p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 6 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(*(A) ( B ) ) ( C) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”*(%(A) (C))(%( B ) (C ) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 6 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t .> reduc t ion 2 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 7 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(+(A) ( B ) ) ( C) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”+(%(A) (C))(%( B ) (C ) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 7 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t .> reduc t ion 3 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 8 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(A) ( * ( B ) (C) ) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”*(%(A) ( B))(%(A) (C ) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 8 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t .> reduc t ion 4 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 9 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(A) ( + ( B ) (C) ) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”+(%(A) ( B))(%(A) (C ) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 9 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t * commutat iv i ty .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 0 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g ( ” * (A) ( B ) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” * (B ) (A) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 1 0 ) ;
}
/ * *
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* Tes t + commutat iv i ty .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 1 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g ( ” + (A) ( B ) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” + (B ) (A) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 1 1 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t * a s s o c i a t i v i t y .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 2 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g ( ” * ( * ( A) ( B ) ) ( C) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” * (A) ( * ( B ) ( C) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 1 2 ) ;
}
/ * *
* Tes t + a s s o c i a t i v i t y .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 3 ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g ( ” + ( + (A) ( B ) ) ( C) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” + (A) ( + ( B ) ( C) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 1 3 ) ;
}
/ * *
* T e s t s f o r P r o p o s i t i o n 9 . ! reduc t ion 1 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 B ( ){
t e s t 1 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* For ! reduc t ion 2 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 2 B ( ){
t e s t 2 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* For ! reduc t ion 3 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 3 B ( ){
t e s t 3 ( ) ;
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}/ * *
* For ! reduc t ion 4 , f o r k =2 . A s s o c i a t i o n does not matter
* due to other c a s e s in the same p r o p o s i t i o n .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 4 B ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”!%(*(A) ( * ( B ) (C ) ) ) ( D) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g ( ” + ( + ( !A) ( + ( ! B ) ( ! C) ) ) ( % ( * ( A) ( * ( B ) (C ) ) ) ( ! D ) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 4 0 0 ) ;
}
/ * *
* For .> reduc t ion 3 , f o r k = 2 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 5 B ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(+(A) ( + (B ) (C ) ) ) ( D) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”+(%(A) (D)) (+(%( B ) ( D)) (+(%(C) (D) ) ( + ( % ( * (A) ( B ) ) ( D) ) ” +
”(+(%(*(A) (C ) ) ( D) ) ( + ( % ( * (B ) (C ) ) ( D) ) ( % ( * (A) ( * ( B ) ( C ) ) ) ( D ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 5 0 0 ) ;
}
/ * *
* For .> reduc t ion 4 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 6 B ( ){
t e s t 8 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* For .> reduc t ion 5 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 7 B ( ){
t e s t 9 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* For obj d i s t r i b u t i o n 1 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 8 B ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(*(A) ( + (B ) (C ) ) ) ( D) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”%(+(*(A) ( B ) ) ( * ( A) ( C ) ) ) ( D) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 8 0 0 ) ;
}
/ * *
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* For obj d i s t r i b u t i o n 2 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 9 B ( ){
f l e f t = new S t r i n g (”%(*(+(A) ( B ) ) ( C ) ) ( D) ” ) ;
f r i g h t = new S t r i n g (”%(+(*(A) (C) ) ( * ( B ) ( C ) ) ) ( D) ” ) ;
printOut ( f l e f t , f r i g h t , 9 0 0 ) ;
}
/ * *
* For * commutat iv i ty .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 0 B ( ){
t e s t 1 0 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* For + commutat iv i ty .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 1 B ( ){
t e s t 1 1 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* For * a s s o c i a t i v i t y .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 2 B ( ){
t e s t 1 2 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* For + a s s o c i a t i v i t y .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id t e s t 1 3 B ( ){
t e s t 1 3 ( ) ;
}
/ * *
* As on the paper , s ave in the p r e f i x form . XX i n d i c a t e s t h a t the s t r i n g i s
* not formulated according to the grammar .
* @param neg depth
* @param l
* @param bool
* @param f s t r
* @return
* /
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p r i v a t e s t a t i c S t r i n g f s i z e ( i n t neg depth , i n t l , boolean bool , S t r i n g f s t r ){
S t r i n g p r e f i x ;
S t r i n g s u f f i x ;
i f ( getFType ( f s t r ) == FType . LITERAL)
re turn ” 1 / 4 ˆ ” + ( new I n t e g e r ( l ) . t o S t r i n g ( ) ) ;
e l s e i f ( getFType ( f s t r ) == FType .NONLITERAL)
re turn f s t r + ”( l =” + new I n t e g e r ( l ) . t o S t r i n g ( ) + ” ) ” ;
e l s e i f ( f s t r . charAt ( 0 ) == ’ ! ’ )
{
negCounterIncrement ( ) ;
re turn ” 1 / 4 ˆ ” + ( new I n t e g e r ( neg depth ) . t o S t r i n g ( ) ) + ” + (” +
f s i z e ( neg depth , l , bool , f s t r . s u b s t r i n g ( 1 ) ) + ” ) ” ;
}
e l s e i f ( f s t r . charAt ( 0 ) == ’%’)
{
obatCounterIncrement ( ) ;
i n t index = g e t I n d e x P a r e n t h e s i s ( f s t r ) ;
p r e f i x = f s t r . s u b s t r i n g ( 2 , index ) ;
s u f f i x = f s t r . s u b s t r i n g ( index +2 , f s t r . l e n g t h () −1);
re turn ”(” +
f s i z e ( neg depth +1 , l , bool , p r e f i x ) + ” + ”
+ f s i z e ( neg depth +1 , l , bool , s u f f i x ) + ” ) ” ;
}
e l s e i f ( f s t r . charAt ( 0 ) == ’* ’ )
{
andCounterIncrement ( ) ;
i n t index = g e t I n d e x P a r e n t h e s i s ( f s t r ) ;
p r e f i x = new S t r i n g ( f s t r . s u b s t r i n g ( 2 , index ) ) ;
s u f f i x = new S t r i n g ( f s t r . s u b s t r i n g ( index +2 , f s t r . l e n g t h ( ) −1) ) ;
i f ( boo l ) re turn ”max(” + f s i z e ( neg depth +1 , l +1 , f a l s e , p r e f i x ) +
” , ” + f s i z e ( neg depth +1 , l +1 , f a l s e , s u f f i x ) + ” ) ” ;
e l s e re turn ”max(” + f s i z e ( neg depth , l , f a l s e , p r e f i x ) +
” , ” + f s i z e ( neg depth , l , f a l s e , s u f f i x ) + ” ) ” ;
}
e l s e i f ( f s t r . charAt (0 )== ’+ ’ ){
i n t index = g e t I n d e x P a r e n t h e s i s ( f s t r ) ;
p r e f i x = f s t r . s u b s t r i n g ( 2 , index ) ;
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s u f f i x = f s t r . s u b s t r i n g ( index +2 , f s t r . l e n g t h () −1);
i f ( boo l ) re turn ”max(” + f s i z e ( neg depth +1 , l +1 , f a l s e , p r e f i x ) +
” , ” + f s i z e ( neg depth +1 , l +1 , f a l s e , s u f f i x ) + ” ) ” ;
e l s e re turn ”max(” + f s i z e ( neg depth , l , f a l s e , p r e f i x ) +
” , ” + f s i z e ( neg depth , l , f a l s e , s u f f i x ) + ” ) ” ;
}
re turn ”XX”;
}
/ * *
* Given a s t r i n g , i t t e l l s i f i t i s a l i t e r a l or a g e n e r a l formula , or
* otherwis e .
* @param i n s t r
* @return
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c FType getFType ( S t r i n g i n s t r )
{
i f ( i n s t r . l e n g t h ( ) >= 2)
{
/ / System . out . p r i n t l n (” Gett ing GFORMULA which i s : ” + i n s t r ) ;
re turn FType .GFORMULA;
}
e l s e i f ( i n s t r . charAt ( 0 ) >= ’a ’ &&
i n s t r . charAt ( 0 ) <= ’ z ’ )
re turn FType . LITERAL;
e l s e
{
/ / System . out . p r i n t l n ( i n s t r + ” I s NONLITERAL . ” ) ;
re turn FType .NONLITERAL;
}
}
/ * *
* Parser . −100 i s an error .
* @param i n s t r
* @return
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c I n t e g e r g e t I n d e x P a r e n t h e s i s ( S t r i n g i n s t r )
{
/ / with s t a c k .
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s t a c k = new Stack<I nteger > ();
S t r i n g curStr = new S t r i n g ( i n s t r ) ;
char curChar ;
f o r ( i n t i =0; i <curStr . l e n g t h ( ) ; i ++)
{
curChar = curStr . charAt ( i ) ;
i f ( curChar == ’ ( ’ )
s t a c k . push ( i ) ;
e l s e i f ( curChar == ’ ) ’ )
{
s t a c k . pop ( ) ;
i f ( s t a c k . isEmpty ( ) )
re turn i ;
}
}
re turn −100;
}
/ * *
* Console p r i n t i n g .
* @param l e f t s t r
* @param r i g h t s t r
* @param n
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id printOut ( S t r i n g l e f t s t r , S t r i n g r i g h t s t r , i n t n )
{
i n t lNegCounter , lObatCounter , lAndCounter ;
counterRes e t ( ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n (”=====TEST” + new I n t e g e r ( n ) . t o S t r i n g ( ) +
” , f a l s e =======” + l e f t s t r + ”===” + r i g h t s t r ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( f s i z e ( 1 , 1 , f a l s e , f l e f t ) ) ;
/ / s t o r e the counter v a l u e s f o r the f i r s t e x p r e s s i o n .
lNegCounter = neg counter ; lObatCounter = obat counter ; lAndCounter =
and counter ;
/ / and r e s e t the counters .
counterRes e t ( ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( f s i z e ( 1 , 1 , f a l s e , f r i g h t ) ) ;
/ / p r i n t the counter v a l u e s .
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System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” 1 / ” + lNegCounter + ” , 1 / ” + lObatCounter + ” , 1 / ”
+ lAndCounter ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” 1 / ” + neg counter + ” , 1 / ” + obat counter + ” , 1 / ”
+ and counter ) ;
counterRes e t ( ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n (”=====TEST” + new I n t e g e r ( n ) . t o S t r i n g ( ) + ” , ” +
” true =======”);
System . out . p r i n t l n ( f s i z e ( 1 , 1 , true , f l e f t ) ) ;
lNegCounter = neg counter ; lObatCounter = obat counter ;
lAndCounter = and counter ;
counterRes e t ( ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( f s i z e ( 1 , 1 , true , f r i g h t ) ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” 1 / ” + lNegCounter + ” , 1 / ” + lObatCounter + ” , 1 / ” +
lAndCounter ) ;
System . out . p r i n t l n ( ” 1 / ” + neg counter + ” , 1 / ” + obat counter + ” , 1 / ” +
and counter ) ;
}
/ * *
* Reset the counters to 1 . 1 means b a s i c a l l y 0 , but as mentioned in the
* c l a s s d e s c r i p t i o n , 1 / 0 i s bad . So the minimum i s 1 .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id counterRes e t ( )
{
obat counter = 1; neg counter = 1; and counter = 1;
}
/ * *
* I n c r e a s e s the counter count ing the occurrences o f %.
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id obatCounterIncrement ( )
{
obat counter ++;
}
/ * *
* I n c r e a s e s the counter count ing the occurrences o f ! .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id negCounterIncrement ( )
{
neg counter ++;
}
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/ * *
* I n c r e a s e s the counter count ing the occurrences o f * .
* /
p r i v a t e s t a t i c vo id andCounterIncrement ( )
{
and counter ++;
}
}
And the test cases for Proposition 7 below. Please refer to the class descrip-
tion of the Java source code for the format. Test 1 tests ¬ reduction 1, Test 2
tests ¬ reduction 2, and so on until Test 4. Test 5 tests ⋗ reduction 1, Test 6
does ⋗ reduction 2, and so on until Test 9. Test 10 and 11 test commutativity
of ∧ and ∨. Test 12 and Test 13 associativity.
=====TEST1, f a l s e =======! s === s
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 )
1 / 4 ˆ 1
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST1, true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 )
1 / 4 ˆ 1
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST2, f a l s e =======!*(A) ( B)===+(!A ) ( ! B)
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (A( l = 1 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (B( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST2, true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + (A( l = 2 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + (B( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST3, f a l s e =======!+(A) ( B)===*(!A ) ( ! B)
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (A( l = 1 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (B( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST3, true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) ) )
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max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + (A( l = 2 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + (B( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST4, f a l s e =======!%( s ) (A)===+( s )(%( s ) ( ! A) )
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + A( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 , ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + (A( l = 1 ) ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 2 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
=====TEST4, true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + A( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 , ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + 1 / 4 ˆ 3 + (A( l = 2 ) ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 2 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
=====TEST5, f a l s e =======%(%(A) ( B ) ) ( C)===*(%(A) (C)) (+(%(A) ( B))(%(A)(%(B ) (C ) ) ) )
( ( A( l =1) + B( l = 1 ) ) + C( l = 1 ) )
max ( (A( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) , max ( (A( l =1) + B( l = 1 ) ) , (A( l =1) + (B( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 5 , 1 / 2
=====TEST5, true =======
( ( A( l =1) + B( l = 1 ) ) + C( l = 1 ) )
max ( (A( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) , max ( (A( l =2) + B( l = 2 ) ) , (A( l =2) + (B( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 5 , 1 / 2
=====TEST6, f a l s e =======%(*(A) ( B ) ) ( C)===*(%(A) (C))(%( B ) ( C) )
( max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) ) + C( l = 1 ) )
max ( (A( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) , (B( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 2
=====TEST6, true =======
( max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) ) + C( l = 1 ) )
max ( (A( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) , (B( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 2
=====TEST7, f a l s e =======%(+(A) ( B ) ) ( C)===+(%(A) (C))(%( B ) ( C) )
( max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) ) + C( l = 1 ) )
max ( (A( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) , (B( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
=====TEST7, true =======
( max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) ) + C( l = 1 ) )
69
max ( (A( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) , (B( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
=====TEST8, f a l s e =======%(A) ( * ( B ) (C))===*(%(A) ( B))(%(A) ( C) )
(A( l =1) + max(B( l =1) , C( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =1) + B( l = 1 ) ) , (A( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 2
=====TEST8, true =======
(A( l =1) + max(B( l =2) , C( l = 2 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =2) + B( l = 2 ) ) , (A( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 2
=====TEST9, f a l s e =======%(A) ( + (B ) (C))===+(%(A) ( B))(%(A) ( C) )
(A( l =1) + max(B( l =1) , C( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =1) + B( l = 1 ) ) , (A( l =1) + C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
=====TEST9, true =======
(A( l =1) + max(B( l =2) , C( l = 2 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =2) + B( l = 2 ) ) , (A( l =2) + C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
=====TEST10 , f a l s e =======*(A) ( B)===*(B ) (A)
max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) )
max(B( l =1) , A( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST10 , true =======
max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) )
max(B( l =2) , A( l = 2 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST11 , f a l s e =======+(A) ( B)===+(B ) (A)
max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) )
max(B( l =1) , A( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST11 , true =======
max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) )
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max(B( l =2) , A( l = 2 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST12 , f a l s e =======*(*(A) ( B ) ) ( C)===*(A) ( * ( B ) (C) )
max(max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) ) , C( l = 1 ) )
max(A( l =1) , max(B( l =1) , C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
=====TEST12 , true =======
max(max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) ) , C( l = 2 ) )
max(A( l =2) , max(B( l =2) , C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
=====TEST13 , f a l s e =======+(+(A) ( B ) ) ( C)===+(A) ( + ( B ) (C) )
max(max(A( l =1) , B( l = 1 ) ) , C( l = 1 ) )
max(A( l =1) , max(B( l =1) , C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST13 , true =======
max(max(A( l =2) , B( l = 2 ) ) , C( l = 2 ) )
max(A( l =2) , max(B( l =2) , C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
Appendix B - test cases for Proposition 9. Test cases for Proposition 9,
and associativity and commutativity cases of ∧ (* in the code) and ∨ (+ in
the code). Some of the lines are very long, and are split in two lines, which
is indicated by SP. Test 1 tests ¬ reduction 1, Test 2 ¬ reduction 2, and so on
until Test 400. Test 500 tests ⋗ reduction 3, Test 8 ⋗ reduction 4, and Test 9
⋗ reduction 5. Test 800 tests obj distribution 1, Test 900 obj distribution 2.
Test 10 - 13 test associativity and commutativity of ∧ and ∨, which are the
same as for Proposition 7.
=====TEST1, f a l s e =======! s === s
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 )
1 / 4 ˆ 1
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST1, true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 )
1 / 4 ˆ 1
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1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST2, f a l s e =======!*(A) ( B)===+(!A ) ( ! B)
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( A( l = 1 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( B( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST2, true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + ( A( l = 2 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + ( B( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST3, f a l s e =======!+(A) ( B)===*(!A ) ( ! B)
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( A( l = 1 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( B( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST3, true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) ) )
max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + ( A( l = 2 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + ( B( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 3 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST400 , f a l s e =======SP
!%(*(A) ( * ( B ) (C ) ) ) ( D)===+(+( !A) ( + ( ! B ) ( ! C) ) ) ( % ( * ( A) ( * ( B ) (C ) ) ) ( ! D) )
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( ( max(A( l =1) ,max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) ) )
max(max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( A( l = 1 ) ) , max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( B( l = 1 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 1 + (C( l = 1 ) ) ) ) , SP
( max(A( l =1) ,max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) ) + 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + (D( l = 1 ) ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
1 / 5 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
=====TEST400 , true =======
1 / 4 ˆ 1 + ( ( max(A( l =2) ,max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) ) )
max(max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + ( A( l = 2 ) ) , max ( 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + ( B( l = 2 ) ) , 1 / 4 ˆ 2 + (C( l = 2 ) ) ) ) , ( max(A( l =2) , SP
max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) ) + 1 / 4 ˆ 3 + (D( l = 2 ) ) ) )
1 / 2 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
1 / 5 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
=====TEST500 , f a l s e =======%(+(A) ( + ( B ) (C ) ) ) ( D)===+(%(A) (D)) (+(%(B ) (D)) (+(%(C) (D) ) SP
(+(%(*(A) ( B ) ) ( D) ) ( + ( % ( * (A) (C ) ) ( D) ) ( + ( % ( * (B ) (C ) ) ( D) ) ( % ( * (A) ( * ( B ) ( C ) ) ) ( D ) ) ) ) ) ) )
( max(A( l =1) ,max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
max ( (A( l =1)+D( l = 1 ) ) , max ( ( B( l =1)+D( l = 1 ) ) , max ( (C( l =1)+D( l = 1 ) ) , SP
max ( ( max(A( l =1) ,B( l =1) )+D( l = 1 ) ) , max ( ( max(A( l =1) ,C( l =1) )+D( l = 1 ) ) , SP
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max ( ( max(B( l =1) ,C( l =1) )+D( l = 1 ) ) , ( max(A( l =1) ,max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 8 , 1 / 6
=====TEST500 , true =======
( max(A( l =2) ,max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
max ( (A( l =2)+D( l = 2 ) ) , max ( ( B( l =2)+D( l = 2 ) ) , max ( (C( l =2)+D( l = 2 ) ) , SP
max ( ( max(A( l =2) ,B( l =2) )+D( l = 2 ) ) , max ( ( max(A( l =2) ,C( l =2) )+D( l = 2 ) ) , SP
max ( ( max(B( l =2) ,C( l =2) )+D( l = 2 ) ) , ( max(A( l =2) ,max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) ) +D( l = 2 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 8 , 1 / 6
=====TEST8, f a l s e =======%(A) ( * ( B ) (C))===*(%(A) ( B))(%(A) ( C) )
(A( l =1)+max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =1)+B( l = 1 ) ) , (A( l =1)+C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 2
=====TEST8, true =======
(A( l =1)+max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =2)+B( l = 2 ) ) , (A( l =2)+C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 2
=====TEST9, f a l s e =======%(A) ( + (B ) (C))===+(%(A) ( B))(%(A) ( C) )
(A( l =1)+max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =1)+B( l = 1 ) ) , (A( l =1)+C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
=====TEST9, true =======
(A( l =1)+max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) )
max ( (A( l =2)+B( l = 2 ) ) , (A( l =2)+C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 3 , 1 / 1
=====TEST800 , f a l s e =======%(*(A) ( + ( B ) (C ) ) ) ( D)===%(+(*(A) ( B ) ) ( * ( A) (C ) ) ) ( D)
( max(A( l =1) ,max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
( max(max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) ) , max(A( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
=====TEST800 , true =======
( max(A( l =2) ,max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
( max(max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) ) , max(A( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
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=====TEST900 , f a l s e =======%(*(+(A) ( B ) ) ( C ) ) ( D)===%(+(*(A) (C ) ) ( * ( B ) (C ) ) ) ( D)
( max(max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) ) ,C( l =1) )+D( l = 1 ) )
( max(max(A( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) , max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
=====TEST900 , true =======
( max(max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) ) ,C( l =2) )+D( l = 1 ) )
( max(max(A( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) , max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) ) +D( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 2 , 1 / 3
=====TEST10 , f a l s e =======*(A) ( B)===*(B ) (A)
max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) )
max(B( l =1) ,A( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST10 , true =======
max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) )
max(B( l =2) ,A( l = 2 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 2
=====TEST11 , f a l s e =======+(A) ( B)===+(B ) (A)
max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) )
max(B( l =1) ,A( l = 1 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST11 , true =======
max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) )
max(B( l =2) ,A( l = 2 ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST12 , f a l s e =======*(*(A) ( B ) ) ( C)===*(A) ( * ( B ) (C) )
max(max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) ) ,C( l = 1 ) )
max(A( l =1) , max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
=====TEST12 , true =======
max(max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) ) ,C( l = 2 ) )
max(A( l =2) , max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 3
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=====TEST13 , f a l s e =======+(+(A) ( B ) ) ( C)===+(A) ( + ( B ) (C) )
max(max(A( l =1) ,B( l = 1 ) ) ,C( l = 1 ) )
max(A( l =1) , max(B( l =1) ,C( l = 1 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
=====TEST13 , true =======
max(max(A( l =2) ,B( l = 2 ) ) ,C( l = 2 ) )
max(A( l =2) , max(B( l =2) ,C( l = 2 ) ) )
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
1 / 1 , 1 / 1 , 1 / 1
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